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The Bibliothèque raisonnée Review of 
Volume 3 of the Treatise: 
Authorship, Text, and Translation 
DAVID FATE NORTON AND DARIO PERINETTI 
Abstract: The review of volume 3 of Hume’s Treatise, a review that appeared in 
the Bibliothèque raisonnée in the spring of 1741, was the ﬁrst published response 
to Hume’s ethical theory. This review is also of interest because of questions 
that have arisen about its authorship and that of the earlier review of volume 
1 of the Treatise in the same journal. In Part 1 of this paper we attribute to 
Pierre Des Maizeaux the notice of vols. 1 and 2 of the Treatise published in the 
spring 1739 issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée. We then focus on the question 
of the authorship of the review of vol. 3. In Part 2 of our paper we provide a 
transcription of the French text of this review. Part 3 is a new English transla­
tion of the review. Part 4 provides comparisons between passages from the text 
of the Treatise, the French translations of these passages in the Bibliothèque 
raisonnée review, and our back-translations of these same passages. We also 
provide brief comparisons between our translation of passages from this review 
and an earlier translation of these passages. 
Volumes 1 and 2 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature,1 ﬁrst published in January 1739, 
were soon after publication the subject of ﬁve notices and four reviews.2 Volume 3, 
published at the end of October 1740, received no notices and was reviewed only in 
the Bibliothèque raisonnée.3 This anonymous review of vol. 3 is of interest not only for 
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what it says about Hume’s views as set out in the third book of the Treatise (this review 
is the ﬁrst published, critical response to Hume’s ethical theory), but also because of 
questions that have arisen about the authorship of this and an earlier review of vol. 
1 of the Treatise published in the same journal. In Part I of this paper we begin by 
reviewing the grounds for attributing to Pierre Des Maizeaux the notice of vols. 1 and 
2 of the Treatise published by the Bibliothèque raisonnée in its April–June, 1739 issue. 
We then focus principally on the question of the authorship of the review of vol. 3 
of the Treatise published by the Bibliothèque raisonnée in its April–June, 1741 issue, 
but we also consider in passing the grounds that have been offered for attributing 
to Francis Hutcheson the critical components of the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of 
vol. 1 of the Treatise. In Part II of the paper we present a transcription of the French 
text, never before reprinted, of this review. Part III is a new English translation of this 
text. In an effort to show the differences between the sense of the Treatise presented 
by translated quotations of it and Hume’s original texts, Part IV offers some three-
column comparisons of three relatively lengthy French “quotations” of Treatise 3 
found in the review, our back-translations of these texts, and the versions of these 
texts found in the Treatise. It then offers in a similar format, comparisons of the 
present and earlier translations of passages of the review of vol. 3. 
I. The Bibliothèque raisonnée and the Treatise 
The Bibliothèque raisonnée was an important French-language periodical published 
in Amsterdam from 1728–1753. From 1728–1741 it was published by the ﬁrm of Wet-
stein and Smith—of Jacques Wetstein and William Smith—and directed by Smith. 
This partnership ended in 1741, and thereafter until its demise in 1753 Wetstein 
alone was director and publisher of the journal.4 During the thirteen years that it 
was directed by Smith the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviewed approximately 465 books. 
Of these, only about twenty, plus the two volumes of the Treatise, may be classiﬁed 
as (sometimes using the term loosely) philosophy.5 Given the subject matter of the 
Treatise, the amount of space the Bibliothèque raisonnée devoted to it was unusual. 
A. The Bibliothèque raisonnée notice of volumes 1 and 2 of the Treatise. A sub­
stantial portion of each issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée was devoted to literary 
news, and news of this kind from London typically came ﬁrst. As we have noted, 
the ﬁrst two volumes of the Treatise were published in the winter of 1739. In the 
spring 1739 issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée the lead item in the news from 
London was this brief notice: 
A gentleman, a Mr. Hume, has published A Treatise of human Nature: being 
an Attempt, &c. That is, Traité de la Nature humaine; où l’on essaye d’introduire 
la Méthode expérimentale de raisonner dans les sujets de Morale. In 8vo. 2 vol. 
This work is divided into two volumes, of which the ﬁrst, concerning the 
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Understanding, contains four Parts each divided into several Sections. The 
ﬁrst Part concerns ideas, their origin, composition, abstraction, connec­
tion, &c.; the second, the ideas of space and time; the third, knowledge 
and probability; and the fourth, scepticism and the other systems of 
philosophy. The second volume, concerning the passions, contains three 
Parts. The ﬁrst Part is concerned with pride and humility; the second with 
love and hatred; and the third with the will and the direct passions. Those 
who desire something new will ﬁnd what they want here. The author 
argues on his own terms, he goes thoroughly into things, and he follows 
new ways of thinking. He is very original.6 
This, the ﬁrst published response to the Treatise, was the work of Pierre Des 
Maizeaux. We can conﬁdently make this attribution for three reasons. (1) From the 
inception of the Bibliothèque raisonnée in 1728 through 1744, Des Maizeaux regularly 
provided the journal with its literary news from London, so that it can be said that 
most of the pages of the “Nouvelles littéraires d’Angleterre” were written by him.7 
(2) On 27 September 1740, William Smith8 sent to Des Maizeaux an itemized list of 
the contributions to vols. 22–4 of the journal for which the latter was to be paid. The 
items listed include the column containing the notice of the Treatise.9 (3) We know 
that Hume revealed his identity as author of the Treatise to Des Maizeaux. That he 
did so accounts for the fact that the author of this notice, alone among those who 
wrote notices or reviews of the Treatise, could identify the author of the work.10 
Pierre Des Maizeaux (1673–1745) was born in Auvergne, France, the son of a 
Calvinist pastor. He and his family moved to Avenches, Switzerland in 1685, and 
Pierre went on to study at Basel (1688?), at the Lyceum in Berne (1690), and ﬁnally at 
the Academy in Geneva (1690). Having decided not to become a pastor (a decision 
for which his father never forgave him), and having done distinguished work for 
teachers with connections to Pierre Bayle, Des Maizeaux went to Holland in 1699. 
He there met not only Bayle, but also Jean Le Clerc and Benjamin Furly. The latter 
two had close connections with John Locke, and all three with Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury. By the summer of 1699 Des Maizeaux was in 
England with letters of recommendation to both Locke and Shaftesbury. He was 
thereafter supported ﬁnancially by, among others, Shaftesbury, Joseph Addison, 
and Anthony Collins. From 1710, until Collins’s death in 1729, Des Maizeaux spent 
long periods with Collins and is thought to have had a hand in the development of 
the latter’s defense of free-thinking (A Discourse of Free-thinking, 1713). Thereafter 
Des Maizeaux was instrumental in the publication of the collected works of Bayle 
(Oeuvres diverses, 4 vols., 1727–1731) and of a new translation of Bayle’s supremely 
important Historical and Critical Dictionary (London, 1734-1738), to which Des 
Maizeaux preﬁxed a lengthy biography of Bayle.11 To sum up: Des Maizeaux spent 
his early years among those who dissented from the established religion of France, 
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and then dissented from them. Much of his adult life was spent in close associa­
tion with English dissenters and free-thinkers. Bearing these associations in mind, 
we may conclude that Des Maizeaux’s comment about vols. 1 and 2 of the Trea­
tise—“Those who desire something new will ﬁnd what they want here. The author 
argues on his own terms, he goes thoroughly into things, and he follows new ways 
of thinking. He is very original.”—is not so bland as it may now seem. 
B. The Bibliothèque raisonnée review of volume 3 of the Treatise. The Bibliothèque 
raisonnée gave more substantial attention to the Treatise on two other occasions. 
In the spring of 1740 it published a 6000-word review of vol. 1;12 one year later it 
published a 4200-word review of vol. 3. There is no direct evidence of the author-
ship of these reviews. During the period in which it was under the direction of 
William Smith (1728–1741), the reviews in the Bibliothèque raisonnée were, with 
rare exception, written by three regular contributors: Des Maizeaux, Jean Bar­
beyrac (1674–1744), and Armand Boisbeleau de La Chapelle (1676–1746).13 Each 
of these three must be considered a possible author of the Treatise reviews. It has 
also been said that these reviews were written by Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746). 
We examine this hypothesis. 
Pierre Des Maizeaux. We must start with a clariﬁcation. Whoever it was that 
wrote the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of vol. 1, he had at his disposal, and made 
ample use of, a copy of Hume’s Abstract of the Treatise, for about two-thirds of the 
review is constituted of a (sometimes loose) translation of that pamphlet. In a real 
sense, then, Hume himself is the source of a substantial part of the review. This 
fact was ﬁrst pointed out by John Yolton, who then went on to suggest that Des 
Maizeaux could easily have had a copy of the Abstract and used that as the basis of 
the review of Volume 1.14 It happens, however, that the letter establishing that Des 
Maizeaux wrote the brief notice quoted above also indicates that he did not write 
the review published in the following spring, for William Smith does not include 
that review in the list of contributions for which Des Maizeaux is to be paid. This 
is not surprising, for Des Maizeaux’s contributions to the Bibliothèque raisonnée 
were nearly always limited to his accounts of the literary news in London. He 
appears to have written no more than a half-dozen reviews and on occasion may 
have passed on to others reviews assigned to him. In addition, critical passages of 
the sort found in the review of Treatise 1 are uncharacteristic of Des Maizeaux’s 
work. Neither in the reviews that can be attributed to him, nor in his longer works 
on Bayle, Saint-Evremond, and others, did Des Maizeaux go beyond reportage to 
criticism or analysis.15 These same facts indicate that it is equally unlikely that Des 
Maizeaux wrote the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of vol. 3. 
Jean Barbeyrac. According to William Smith, Jean Barbeyrac wrote two-thirds 
of the reviews in the Bibliothèque raisonnée.16 But despite this substantial level of 
contribution, it is unlikely that Barbeyrac is the author of either of the Bibliothèque 
raisonnée reviews of the Treatise. We reach this conclusion for a variety of reasons. 
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(1) These reviews are not among the 124 Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews that 
scholars have attributed to Barbeyrac.17 
(2) The reviews are not like the reviews that Barbeyrac is thought to have writ-
ten. The typical Barbeyrac review is an extract, a careful summary, with copious 
scholarly notes (especially to classical sources), without critical commentary.18 
As we have said, the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews of the Treatise include critical 
passages. The number of notes in these reviews is of modest proportions, and 
only a single note, found in the review of vol. 1, refers to a classical source (Sextus 
Empiricus on causation).19 
(3) Barbeyrac, when faced with an anonymous work, invariably makes a point 
of providing his readers with the identity, or likely identity, of the author of that 
work.20 Given that Des Maizeaux had identiﬁed the author of the Treatise in an 
earlier issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée, we believe Barbeyrac would have repeated 
this information had he reviewed the Treatise. 
(4) Barbeyrac said that he was motivated to write reviews because he wanted the 
books for his library, and that he possessed all but two of the works he had reviewed.21 
His extensive library was catalogued in the year of his death and auctioned the fol­
lowing year. Neither the Treatise nor the Abstract are listed in that catalogue.22 
On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that it is unlikely that Barbeyrac 
reviewed the Treatise, but no direct evidence rules out this possibility. 
Francis Hutcheson. The attribution of the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews to 
Hutcheson, a hypothesis that originated with James Moore, begins with Hume’s one 
extant comment on the Abstract, a comment made in a letter to Hutcheson:23 
My Bookseller has sent to Mr Smith a Copy of my Book, which I hope he 
has receiv’d, as well as your Letter. I have not heard yet what he has done 
with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but 
not in the Works of the Learned; there having been an Article with regard 
to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up 
the Abstract.24 
Moore’s conclusion that the critical components of the Bibliothèque raisonnée 
review of vol. 1 of the Treatise, and the entire review of vol. 3, were the work of 
Hutcheson, rests on an extended set of considerations and claims: 
(M1) That the “Mr Smith” mentioned by Hume in this brief remark was an old 
friend of Hutcheson, namely, William Smith of Smith and Wetstein, Amsterdam, 
and that it was Hutcheson, not Hume, Charles Corbet, or John Noon, who sent the 
Abstract to Smith.25 Moore notes that Hutcheson had several years earlier sent Smith 
a letter praising a work by Robert Simson, Professor of Mathematics at the University 
of Glasgow, and that Smith then published a translation of this letter from, as he 
put it, “Francis Hutcheson, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow . . . 
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his old and intimate friend.” As Moore points out, this letter was written by Simson 
himself, and thus, he argues, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Hutcheson acted 
analogously when Hume gave him a manuscript of the Abstract.26 
(M2) That at the same time Hutcheson sent Smith a manuscript of the Abstract he 
also sent to him the critical comments that constitute up to one-third of the review 
of vol. 1. Moore reaches this conclusion by reviewing Hutcheson’s early writings on 
logic and metaphysics,27 and comparing them with the critical comments found 
in the review of vol. 1. These comments are characterized as “in every case consis­
tent with what is known of Hutcheson’s logic and metaphysics as set out in his . . . 
Latin compends and in his better known English writings and correspondence.”28 
Although he elsewhere grants that it is “possible that these comments on the Abstract 
were provided for Smith, not by Hutcheson but by one of the regular contributors” 
to the Bibliothèque raisonnée, Barbeyrac, Des Maizeaux, or La Chapelle, Moore goes 
on to say that this account of the matter is “highly improbable” for two reasons. 
“First, there is no evidence, no mention of the two reviews in any of the surviving 
correspondence” or other remains of these three individuals. Second, in Moore’s view 
“Hume appears to have concluded that the comments were the work of Hutcheson,” 
for a few months later, in the Appendix to vol. 3 of the Treatise, he “took up these 
remarks . . . and responded to them, in the same order or sequence in which they 
appeared in the review” and in language that is, as Moore describes it, “evocative of 
[his] correspondence with Hutcheson.” That is to say, Moore points out, Hume begins 
the Appendix by saying that he is glad to have “an opportunity of confessing my 
errors” (App. 1; SBN 623), and then goes on to clarify his ideas of belief and power; 
to reﬂect on his discussion of the self or personal identity; to consider his account of 
abstract ideas; to reiterate his observation that many philosophers decline to offer a 
deﬁnition of equality; and to offer a general defence of skepticism.29 
(M3) That when Wm. Smith “undertook to review book 3 of the Treatise . . . 
he again consulted Hutcheson.” It would have been odd, we are told, if he had 
not done so given Hutcheson’s stature as a moral philosopher. In addition, Moore 
claims: “None of the reviewer’s concerns are intelligible if one supposes that the 
review was written by Barbeyrac or La Chapelle, the regular contributors to the 
journal: their moral philosophies, like Smith’s were natural law theories, modelled 
on Pufendorf, Locke, and Cumberland. The critical perspective of the reviewer, on 
the other hand, was particularly and peculiarly Hutcheson’s.”30 
(M4) “There is enough correspondence in Dutch and French archives . . . to 
rule out the usual contributors as author of these reviews.”31 
We are in agreement with several features of this account. The “Mr Smith” men­
tioned in Hume’s letter to Hutcheson is almost certainly William Smith, the editor 
of the Bibliothèque raisonnée. That Hutcheson sent to Smith a copy of Robert Simson’s 
abstract of his book on conic sections is a matter of record. Hume and Hutcheson 
obviously did discuss publication venues for the Abstract, and Hutcheson may well 
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have suggested sending the work to Smith, and may in fact have sent a manuscript 
of it to him. There is no known external evidence —manuscripts or letters—linking 
the two reviews to the regular contributors to the Bibliothèque raisonnée, and, as we 
have shown, there are good grounds for concluding that the two reviews were not the 
work of Des Maizeaux or Barbeyrac. There is also some evidence that the two reviews 
had the same author,32 and it is clear that the Appendix to vol. 3 takes up (among 
other things) the issues of belief, personal identity, abstract ideas, equality, and skep­
ticism. Finally, it is generally agreed that there are between Hume and Hutcheson 
deep philosophical differences, especially about moral theory, differences that in 
1744–1745 appear to have led Hutcheson to oppose Hume’s candidacy for the posi­
tion of Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.33 
Seen as it were from a distance, these facts may allow one to suppose that 
the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews of the Treatise are the work of Hutcheson, but a 
closer look leads to a different conclusion. This closer look shows it unlikely that 
Hutcheson provided the critical components of the review of vol. 1 of the Treatise, 
and highly improbable that he was the author of the review of vol. 3. 
In opposition to Moore’s theses, M1–M4, we suggest: 
(N-P1) That while Hutcheson may have sent a manuscript of the Abstract to 
Smith, a closer reading of Hume’s admittedly meagre remark about this matter leads 
us to suggest that it was Hume himself who sent a copy of the Abstract to Smith. 
In his brief remark Hume ﬁrst hopes two things: that “Mr Smith” has received the 
copy of the Treatise sent by his publisher, John Noon, and that he has received a 
letter sent by Hutcheson. He then says: “I have not heard yet what he has done 
with the Abstract. Perhaps you have.” This suggests that Hume himself, because 
he sent the Abstract to Smith, had reason to hear from Smith about it. Because he 
had not so heard, he wonders if Hutcheson has. In short, Hume seems to be saying: 
“Noon sent the Treatise; you (Hutcheson) sent a letter; I sent the Abstract; I haven’t 
heard if any of these missives has reached its objective; have you?” 
(N-P2) That while there is no doubt that Hutcheson sent Smith an authorial 
abstract of Robert Simson’s book, there is a signiﬁcant disanalogy between that 
action and what Moore supposes Hutcheson to have done with Hume’s Abstract, a 
disanalogy that is at the heart of our disagreement with Moore. In this second case 
Hutcheson is supposed to have sent not merely an authorial abstract, as he did for 
Simson, but also to have sent a set of objections to the work abstracted. 
This disanalogy is of greater importance than it may seem at ﬁrst glance. 
Moore is asking us to suppose that on two occasions Hutcheson pretended to be 
giving assistance to Hume, a young philosopher who had sought that help, but 
then blind-sided him with covert criticisms sent to Smith. In the ﬁrst instance 
the scenario would have been essentially this: “Yes, David Hume, I’ll help you 
publicize your work. You make a copy of your abstract for my old friend William 
Smith, and send it to him. In the meantime I’ll write to him and encourage him 
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to publish the abstract in the Bibliothèque raisonnée. I did this for my colleague 
Robert Simson, and Smith published what Simson wrote and I sent him.” But 
on this occasion, instead of sending Smith a positive letter along with the text of 
the Abstract, Hutcheson is supposed to have sent a critical letter—to have listed 
the faults of the book he is recommending for review—and thereby provided the 
critical content of the review of vol. 1.34 
The second scenario would have gone like this: Hutcheson offered to recom­
mend vol. 3 of the Treatise to his own publisher, Thomas Longman. Hume asked for 
this letter, and Hutcheson wrote it, this being a safe inference to draw from the fact 
that Longman did publish the third volume of the Treatise.35 But then, having given 
Hume this substantial assistance, Hutcheson is again supposed to have blind-sided 
his younger colleague by covertly criticizing, in the Bibliothèque raisonnée review 
of this volume, the same book that he had recommended to Longman. 
Both these scenarios attribute to Hutcheson a deviousness or duplicity in-
consistent with his known moral character. William Leechman, Hutcheson’s 
colleague at Glasgow, said of him that he had “the most amiable dispositions and 
most useful virtues: the purity of his manners was unspotted from his youth . . . 
His integrity was strict and inviolable: he abhorred the least appearance of deceit 
either in word or actions . . . his nature was frank, and open, and warmly disposed, 
to speak what he took to be true.”36 
(N-P3) As we show below, at least one regular contributor to the Bibliothèque 
raisonnée, Armand de La Chapelle, was both capable of, and experienced at, reviews 
in several ways like that of vol. 3 of the Treatise. That is, contrary to Moore’s claim 
(M3), the critical portions of the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of the Treatise are 
well within La Chapelle’s interests and capabilities. 
(N-P4) Neither we nor Lagarrigue have been able to ﬁnd correspondence in 
Dutch and French archives sufﬁcient “to rule out the usual contributors as author 
of these reviews.” Indeed, Lagarrigue reports that he has examined, in archives 
throughout Europe, more than 7000 unpublished letters of individuals associated 
with the Bibliothèque raisonnée, and has found only one letter, that cited in note 9, 
that bears on the authorship of this review or the review of vol. 1.37 
(N-P5) Internal evidence also shows it highly improbable that this review was 
by Hutcheson. The author of the review reveals early on that he is suspicious of 
philosophical attempts to provide a foundation for morality. The “metaphysician 
who undertakes to demonstrate the principles of natural right by making them ab­
stract wastes his time and effort.” It is not just that such abstract approaches, because 
they are understood by so few, can be of limited beneﬁt. It is, more importantly, 
that these works, because they are obscure and make virtue seem disagreeable, do 
more harm than good.38 Moreover, as the review progresses this general suspicion 
of philosophical morals is replaced by a more narrowly focused dissatisfaction with 
the moral sense theory found famously in the work of Hutcheson, and now in this 
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new work. Noting that Treatise 3.1.1 (Moral distinctions not deriv’d from reason) raises 
the issue of the foundation or source of moral distinctions, and that the views of 
both Clarke and Wollaston are rejected as unsound, the reviewer complains that the 
author of the Treatise “approves none of what is most approved on this subject.”39 
Then, following a substantial sketch of Hume’s arguments showing that moral 
distinctions cannot derive from reason, the reviewer turns to the positive theory 
of the Treatise. Those who wonder how this skilful metaphysician explains virtue 
and vice should know that he supposes that “the mind, as much as the body, has 
a taste,” and that it is this taste or sense that enables it to distinguish right from 
wrong in the same way that we can “at ﬁrst glance distinguish that which is beauti­
ful from that which is ugly. It is a matter of sentiment: reasoning has no place in 
it,” for virtue or that which “is right gives pleasure and is approved; what is wrong 
produces pain and is blamed.”40 The reader is next provided with a more complete 
summary of Hume’s theory,41 and then a lengthy paragraph criticizing him for 
offering nothing more than an unimproved version of the useless, demonstrably 
defective moral sense theory of Hutcheson: 
That is the whole system of our author. When Mr Hutcheson proposed it in 
his Recherches sur l’origine des Idées que nous avons de la Vertu & du Bien mor­
al,42 able people found in it three great ﬂaws. Firstly, they did not approve 
of this supposition of a new mental faculty, intended only to enable our 
mind to discern right from wrong. They saw this as absolutely useless, and 
claimed that the mind, given its indisputable capacity to reﬂect and sense, 
is adequately furnished with all that is necessary for it to distinguish good 
from evil. Secondly, they observed that in this system the perception of 
objects is confounded with the sentiments that result from it. On this, Mr. 
Burnet raised objections that up until now have remained unanswered.43 
Thirdly, and last, they did not conceal that this mental taste, or this moral 
sentiment, whatever one wishes to call it, is clearly linked to fanaticism, and 
can at least very easily open the door to the excesses of enthusiasm. Dr. 
Berkeley sharply exposed this difﬁculty in his Alciphron,44 and made it clear 
that nothing would be more arbitrary than the ideas of right and wrong if 
these depended on such an inner taste. I do not understand how it is that 
our author did not ﬁnd it appropriate to examine the objections of these 
scholars. They would have opened a beautiful ﬁeld for his speculations, 
and for his profound metaphysics. Perhaps it is modesty, perhaps even 
prudence. How can one add anything to the ingenious efforts that Mr. 
Hutcheson has opposed to Mr. Burnet’s reﬂections on this topic?45 
These pointed criticisms of Hutcheson’s moral theory tell heavily against 
the hypothesis that Hutcheson is the author of this review. Hume is severely 
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criticized for offering an overcomplicated theory, the theory of a moral sense, 
when no theory is needed, and when, furthermore, any competent philosopher 
would already know that this theory, a theory explicitly attributed to Hutcheson, 
has been shown to be: (i) useless and redundant; (ii) philosophically confused (it 
confounds the perception of objects with the sentiments such perception pro­
duces); and (iii) a tool of enthusiasm or even fanaticism. The reviewer goes on to 
criticize Hume for failing to attempt to rescue this sorry theory, but for present 
purposes we point out that the reviewer’s criticism of Hutcheson is here neither 
indirect or implicit. The shortcomings of Hume’s theory of moral perception are 
precisely the substantial shortcomings of Hutcheson’s theory. We suggest that it is 
highly unlikely that Hutcheson would have criticized Hume by pointing out that 
the moral theory of the Treatise has exactly the same ﬂaws that competent critics 
have found in Hutcheson’s own theory. 
Taking these points together, we conclude it highly unlikely that Hutcheson 
was the author of this review. 
Armand Boisbeleau de La Chapelle. We suggest that the author of the Bibliothèque 
raisonnée review of vol. 3 of the Treatise was most likely to have been Armand 
Boisbeleau de La Chapelle. There is both external and internal evidence to sup-
port this hypothesis. 
(1) The suggestion that it was La Chapelle who wrote the review in question 
is consistent with the known practices of those associated with the Bibliothèque 
raisonnée during the years that William Smith directed the journal. Smith thought 
La Chapelle an informed and spirited scholar, and would have known that he had a 
continuing interest in moral philosophy.46 La Chapelle had translated into French 
and published a part of the Tatler,47 and Humphrey Ditton’s Discourse concerning 
the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, a work that includes a lengthy discussion of the 
nature of moral certainty and belief. In his translation of this work La Chapelle 
added notes referring to Toland, Locke, Hobbes, Stillingﬂeet, Pierre-Daniel Huet, 
Fontenelle, and Descartes.48 In the Bibliothèque angloise, the immediate predecessor 
of Bibliothèque raisonnée, La Chapelle had reviewed William Wollaston’s Religion 
of Nature Delineated; John Clarke’s An Enquiry into the Cause and Origin of Natural 
Evil; the second edition of Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees; and a work by 
one of Mandeville’s critics, George Blewitt’s An Enquiry Whether a General Practice 
of Virtue Tends to the Wealth or Poverty, Beneﬁt or Disadvantage of a People. He had 
also brieﬂy discussed Hutcheson’s Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue.49 In the Bibliothèque raisonnée La Chapelle is credited with reviewing two 
editions of Boullier’s Essai philosophique sur l’âme des bêtes.50 The second edition 
of this work is also concerned with moral certainty and belief.51 He also reviewed 
F.-A. Boureau-Deslandes’s Histoire critique de la philosophie, and Christian Wolff’s 
Theologia naturalis.52 La Chapelle had the background and interest to write both 
Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews of the Treatise. 
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(2) The style of the review of Treatise 3 is recognizably that of La Chapelle. 
This review is a critical review, while it was La Chapelle almost alone among the 
contributors to the Bibliothèque raisonnée who added an element of criticism to 
his reviews. This critical tone was not just a matter of temperament. La Chapelle 
openly advocated the inclusion of criticism in his reviews, refusing to restrict 
himself to copying long and boring excerpts. It is, he said, “necessary that the 
criticism of a journal be a little argumentative; it is necessary to include discus­
sion and proofs, and then how is one to avoid raillery and banter if the occasion 
lends itself to that?”53 As a result, La Chapelle’s reviews characteristically combine 
paraphrase and excerpts with critical remarks and digressions, features found in 
the review of Treatise 3. 
As corollaries of this critical attitude, La Chapelle had two favourite criticisms: 
objections to what he found to be obscure and confusing language, and to false 
pretensions of originality. Philosophers often fail, he said, to reach the appropriate 
equilibrium between satisfying the specialist and reaching a larger public. Review­
ing Boureau-Deslandes’s Histoire critique de la philosophie, he wrote: 
If there is a risk in public speech it is particularly at this juncture. Does 
one want to be content with stating superﬁcial and ordinary remarks 
with simplicity? Scholars get bored, close the book and do not open it 
again. Does one want, on the contrary, to elevate oneself? One becomes 
unintelligible to ordinary readers, who get tired and discouraged. It is 
necessary to be skilful enough to strike the right balance.54 
Boureau-Deslandes’s Histoire critique failed to come close to this exacting standard. 
La Chapelle found in this work “manners of speaking so unnatural” that they 
“cause an extreme pain.”55 Of Christian Wolff’s Theologia naturalis, he observed 
that it is difﬁcult “to grasp the truth when it is lost in the labyrinth of a long chain 
of complicated propositions.”56 Compare these remarks with this passage from 
the review of Treatise 3: 
It is sometimes unfortunate to have too much genius and penetration. If 
one does not bring oneself near enough to the level of the vulgar, one is 
not understood, and then it is wholly in vain that one delivers to them 
all these speculations, for their beauties, being too sublime, remain un­
perceived. Nevertheless, when one intends to reform the ideas of almost 
all humankind, and to open paths new even to the eyes of philosophers, 
it would be only natural before all things to forge a language that is 
simple and clear, which anyone could easily understand. Without this 
it is impossible to communicate one’s ideas, and even more difﬁcult to 
make them agreeable.57 
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La Chapelle also appears to have taken pleasure in showing that an author’s 
pretensions to originality are ill-founded. One of the earliest casualties of this 
rhetorical weapon was none other than Francis Hutcheson himself, whose Inquiry 
was given a short notice in Bibliothèque Angloise. La Chapelle accused Hutcheson 
of plagiarizing from Jean-Pierre Crousaz’s Traité du beau.58 Not only did Hutcheson 
“daringly repeat the original” (se débite hardiment pour l’Original), but he also 
pretended to be “the ﬁrst to have clariﬁed the chaos that hitherto reigned in this 
philosophical ﬁeld.”59 Boullier’s Essai philosophique received the same treatment. 
Boullier claimed to have opened new philosophical paths by producing a treatise 
on moral certainty. La Chapelle pointed out that this was not a new subject, and 
that Humphrey Ditton had written an excellent book (translated by La Chapelle, 
as we have seen) dealing extensively with the topic—a book that Boullier had not 
so much as mentioned.60 Wolff’s lack of originality is similarly emphasized. The 
German philosopher is “persuaded that no one before him has produced a clear 
and solid demonstration of the existence and attributes of God.” Not so, accord­
ing to La Chapelle: Wolff’s system has already been taught by “skilful Jesuits” who 
had followed St. Augustine.61 
The review of vol. 3 of the Treatise is consistent with this pattern. Although 
there is some concession to the originality of the author,62 the reviewer not only 
suggests, as we have noted, that Hume’s account of the moral sense is simply 
Hutcheson warmed over, he also says that Hume’s account of justice is simply 
“Hobbes’s system clothed in a new fashion.”63 
(3) The orientation of the Bibliothèque raisonnée reviews of the Treatise is con­
sistent with La Chapelle’s known philosophical interests and views, which are not, 
as Moore maintains, marked by a commitment to natural law theories. As we have 
seen, La Chapelle’s reviews show him to have had a continuing interest in the latest 
productions of British moral philosophers. In the Bibliothèque angloise this interest 
manifests itself in reviews of works by John Clarke, Wollaston, and Hutcheson, 
two of whose names reappear in the review of Treatise 3. When we observe that La 
Chapelle’s positive review of the work of Wollaston has a parallel in the positive 
comments made about his views in the Bibliothèque raisonnée discussion of Treatise 
3,64 and that his earlier hostility to the work of Hutcheson is also reﬂected in that 
discussion, we have further grounds for supposing it was La Chapelle who wrote 
the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of the third volume of the Treatise. 
(4) There are some characteristic linguistic similarities between La Chapelle’s 
earlier reviews and the review of Treatise 3. La Chapelle is fond of “candidly” (ingénu­
ment or avec ingénuité) admitting his ignorance about some of the issues raised by 
the authors he is reviewing. In the Bibliothèque angloise he said, after reporting an 
argument by John Clarke, “I confess very candidly, that I’m not endowed with dis­
cernment enough to discover the soundness of this argument.”65 In a Bibliothèque 
raisonnée review he said: “I would say it even candidly. Even when we would make 
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a lot of Mr. Deslandes’ lights and discernment, we could neither adopt all his ideas 
on the different subject matters making up the Histoire Critique de la Philosophie, 
nor could we hold back the reasons that prevent us from adopting them.”66 The 
reviewer of Treatise 3 says: “I candidly admit my ignorance. I was stopped at the 
beginning of the ﬁrst part.”67 
There is also a signiﬁcant similarity between the concluding words of La Cha­
pelle’s review of the Fable of the Bees and a remark found near the end of the review 
of vol. 3 of the Treatise. In the earlier of these reviews La Chapelle had said: 
This is certainly enough, and perhaps too much, to reveal the morals 
of this author—his principles, his views, his style, and his manner of 
reasoning.68 
In the later one he says: 
But this is indeed more than is necessary to give an idea of the morals 
of the profound author of all the beautiful discoveries contained in the 
Treatise of Human Nature.69 
Taken together, these considerations lend substantial support to the 
hypothesis that it was La Chapelle who wrote the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of 
Treatise 3. 
Armand Boisbeleau de La Chapelle was born at Auzillac, in Saintonge (now 
Charente Inférieure). He studied ﬁrst at the College of Bordeaux, but after 1685 
was sent to London to study with Isaac Dubourdies, pastor of one of the French 
churches there. By the time he was eighteen his studies of church history and 
theology had qualiﬁed him to become a pastor. After two years in Ireland, he was 
in 1707 named pastor at Wandsworth, near London, and in 1711, to three united 
churches in London. In 1725 he accepted a call to the pastorate of the Walloon 
church at The Hague. In the meantime, he had in 1719 become editor of the 
Bibliothèque angloise, and he continued to produce that journal until its demise in 
1727. The following year he joined the editorial team of Bibliothèque raisonnée, and 
continued this connection until 1742, by which time William Smith had ceased to 
oversee the journal. Some of his contributions to the Bibliothèque raisonnée, insofar 
as they are relevant to this paper, have been sketched above.70 
It cannot be said that La Chapelle was, like Des Maizeaux, a conﬁdante of 
free-thinkers. But La Chapelle was a religious dissenter, and he took the view that 
even libertine views should be published and discussed. He told his readers that 
Mandeville’s Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue undermines “the foundation 
of morals, which suppose an essential difference between vice and virtue,” and 
that Mandeville’s commentary on his poetic Fable of the Bees, which draws heav-
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ily on Montaigne, Bayle, and others, “makes things worse, if that is possible.” It 
does this because its author, having shown “the corruption of humankind,” does 
not condemn, but eulogizes this condition. At this point, La Chapelle explains 
why he is nevertheless going on to report and discuss some of Mandeville’s most 
licentious passages: 
I do not know whether reasonable readers will appreciate my effort. I 
mean readers who have conscience and religion. Those lacking these will 
doubtless be charmed at ﬁnding here a system of libertinage and the com­
monplaces of debauchery. But that which will please those individuals can 
only scandalize other people. Would I not do better to follow the taste of 
the latter? Some will, perhaps, answer “yes” to this question. Nevertheless, 
would you believe me if I very sincerely and with all the simplicity of my 
heart, said that this answer does not appear to me to be sufﬁciently thought 
out? It is my settled view that what we call dangerous books are dangerous 
only because of the mysterious air we give them. If instead of banning 
them, or of talking only secretly about them, we would meet them with 
good responses—with, that is, solid and well-written responses, for those 
two things are equally necessary—what would happen? The libertine works 
would get all the contempt they deserve, and truth, crowned with a new 
victory, would only be more triumphant. I know only of bad causes that 
gain or can gain from the suppression of books and arguments from the 
opposite point of view. If I had to justify this, I think I would not be short 
of proofs. I may be wrong, but that is nonetheless my opinion and not 
until I am led to change it will I scruple to review dangerous pieces, while 
taking care to interweave with them my observations in order to show their 
weakness, or include the refutations that others have published.71 
Although it is not obvious that La Chapelle found Hume’s Treatise to be danger­
ous, he did “interweave” into his review of it his own observations and criticisms. 
In doing so he gave us the ﬁrst philosophically signiﬁcant response to Hume’s 
moral theory. 
* * * * * 
Post-Script. It was only a few months before his death in August 1776 that Hume 
made his famous comment on the fate of the Treatise: 
Never literary Attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of human 
Nature. It fell dead-born from the Press; without reaching such distinction 
as even to excite a Murmur among the Zealots. 
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Those who cite this famous remark all too often overlook the historical context 
Hume gives it. Just prior to saying the Treatise fell dead-born, he had said: 
In the end of 1738, I published my Treatise; and immediatly went down 
to my Mother and my Brother, who lived at his Countrey house and was 
employing himself, very judiciously and successfully in the Improvement 
of his Fortune. 
And just after, he goes on to say: 
But being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine Temper, I very soon re-
covered the Blow, and prosecuted with great Ardour my Studies in the 
Country. In 1742, I printed at Edinburgh the ﬁrst part of my Essays: the 
work was favourably received, and soon made me entirely forget my 
former Disappointment.72 
In other words, when Hume said that the Treatise fell dead-born from the press, 
he was speaking about exactly the period, 1739–1741, in which the Treatise was 
noticed and reviewed in the Bibliothèque raisonnée, and thus we know that his great 
work did not come into the world unnoticed. It was, for its time, widely reviewed. 
There were three notices and ﬁve reviews of the Treatise, as well as a substantive 
(and critical) letter to the editor of Commonsense.73 One of these reviews, and one 
we know that Hume had read, that in the History of the Works of the Learned, does 
at times appear to be the “Murmur” of a zealot.74 
What, then, are we to make of Hume’s “dead-born from the Press”? Are we 
to conclude that he did not value these reviews? That he did not count them as 
genuine notice of the Treatise? That by 1776 he had forgotten about them? That 
a dead-born Treatise suited well the literary history of himself that he hoped to 
promote?75 On this matter we are left with a puzzle, but whatever may account 
for Hume’s famous claim, the Treatise did receive signiﬁcant attention in the years 
immediately following its publication. Moreover, the most complete coverage of 
it was that published in the Bibliothèque raisonnée, some of which was written by 
Pierre Des Maizeaux, and some, we believe, by Armand de La Chapelle. 
II. The Text 
We present here a diplomatic edition of the Bibliothèque raisonnée review of 
volume 3 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Interpolations (a missing word, a 
missing letter, and missing punctuation) and corrections (a mistaken reference) 
appear within angle-brackets. Original page numbers appear within angle-
brackets printed superscript. The footnotes of the original review follow an 
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alphabetical sequence that begins anew with each page. To follow that pattern 
while embedding the relatively short pages of the small octavo Bibliothèque rai-
sonnée76 within the much longer pages of this journal would result in more than 
one note a or b at the foot of a single Hume Studies page. To avoid the confusion 
this would create, we have ﬂagged notes with a non-repeating sequence of let­
ters, a, b, c . . . p.77 As nothing would be gained by reproducing the inconsistent 
placement of footnote ﬂags in relation to the punctuation of the copy-text, we 
have uniformly placed these after commas and periods. In addition, no attempt 
has been made to reproduce the initial drop capital “vo,” in voici at the begin­
ning of the review, or to use the long “s” and the many ligatures commonly 
used in eighteenth-century printing. Finally, quotation marks and their use 
have been modernized. 
The copy-text for the present edition is the copy of the 
BIBLIOTHÈQUE RAISONNÉE DES OUVRAGES DES SAVANS DE L’EUROPE 
Pour les Mois D’Avril, Mai & Juin, 1741. Tome Vingt-Six. Seconde Partie. 
held by the Special Collections Department, University of Victoria Library, Victo­
ria, British Columbia, Canada (shelf mark Z1016 B5). The title-page of this copy is 
shown in facsimile here. We have also consulted the corresponding copy in a fac­
simile edition of the Bibliothèque raisonnée (Genève: Slatkine, 1969). This facsimile 
reprint includes three periods that are not found in our copy-text, but that are 
supplied in brackets in the present edition (see below, pages <414>, <416>, and <426>). 
ARTICLE VIII. 
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, being an attempt to introduce the experimental Method 
of reasoning into Moral Subjects. Volume III. 
C’est-à-dire: 
TRAITÉ SUR LA NATURE HUMAINE, dans lequel on essaye d’introduire la Méthode de raisonner 
par Expérience dans les Sujets de Morale. T. III. Sur la Morale, pagg. 310. en y com­
prenant un Appendice qui contient des éclaircissemens sur quelques endroits des deux 
prémiers Tomes. A Londres, pour Thomas Longman, 1740, grand Octavo. 
Voici la troisième Partie d’un Ouvrage, dont les deux prémières ont roulé, ainsi que 
nous le disions dans le Tome XXIV.de cette Bibliothèque, sur l’Entendement, & sur 
les Passions. L’Auteur y met la dernière main à l’exécution de son plan. Il y traite 
des matières les plus intéressantes au bonheur de l’Homme, <412> & ces matières 
étant faites pour être entendues de tout le monde, il a tâché de s’exprimer d’une 
manière plus intelligible, qu’il ne l’avoit fait dans les Volumes précédens. 
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FACSIMILE OF THE TITLE-PAGE 
« Il est bon, dit-il dans un court Avertissement, que le Public sache que 
cette troisième Partie du Traité de la Nature Humaine, est en quelque sorte 
indépendante des deux prémières, & qu’on pourra fort bien l’entrendre, 
sans être initié dans les raisonnemens abstraits des deux autres. Je ne doute 
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point que le commun des Lecteurs n’en saisisse les principes, pourvu 
qu’on y apporte la même attention, qu’on donne à tous les Ouvrages de 
ce genre. Il faut seulement se souvenir que je prens toujours les termes 
d’Impressions & d’Idées dans le même sens, & que par des a Impressions 
j’entends des perceptions fortes & vives, telles que sont nos affections, 
nos sensations, nos sentimens; au-lieu que par des Idées je n’entends que 
des perceptions languissantes & foibles, ou que les copies de celles-ci dans 
la mémoire & dans l’imagination ». 
Nous souhaitons de toute notre ame, que le Public juge des choses comme 
l’Auteur l’espère: mais ce n’est pas sans appréhender que le commun des Lecteurs ne se 
plaigne encore que sa Métaphysique est un peu obscure, & qu’il auroit pu y répandre 
plus de jour. Il est quelquefois <413> malheureux d’avoir trop d’esprit & de pénétra­
tion. Comme on ne s’abbaisse point assez à la portée du vulgaire, on n’en est point 
entendu, & c’est en pure perte qu’on lui débite des spéculations, dont il n’apperçoit 
pas les beautés trop sublimes pour lui. Cependant, quand on veut réformer les idées 
de presque tout le Genre-humain, & se tracer des routes nouvelles aux yeux mêmes 
des Philosophes, il seroit naturel de se faire avant toutes choses un langage simple 
& clair, que tout le monde pût aisément comprendre. Sans cela il est impossible de 
communiquer ses idées, & moins encore de les faire goûter. La Morale, principale­
ment, doit être enseignée avec la plus grande simplicité. Un Métaphysicien qui croit 
démontrer les principes du Droit Naturel, à force de les rendre abstraits perd son 
tems & sa peine. Peu de gens savent apprécier son travail, & presque personne n’en 
proﬁte. Je ne sai même, si cette méthode ne fait pas réellement du tort à la Religion, 
contre l’intention des Philosophes qui s’en servent. On sait que le cœur cherche 
incessamment des prétextes pour se dispenser de l’obéissance; & quel prétexte plus 
plausible que celui qui se tire de l’obscurité des Ouvrages qu’on publie pour enseigner 
les élémens de la Vertu? Est-ce aﬁn de les rendre aimables, qu’on les rend si difﬁciles? 
N’est-ce pas au contraire le moyen d’en dégoûter pour toujours? 
Nous ne faisons, comme on voit, qu’étendre les idées de l’Auteur de ce Traité, 
& nous nous croyons obligés à lui rendre cette justice, qu’il <414> a réellement fait 
quelques efforts pour se proportionner à la capacité d’un plus grand nombre de 
personnes. Non seulement il a eu soin d’éclaircir quelquefois ses principes par des 
exemples populaires; il a outre cela souvent ajouté des Notes au Texte, & ces Notes, 
au moins la plupart, y répandent véritablement quelque lumière. 
Tout ce troisième livre est divisé en trois Parties, dont voici le Plan. 
La I. Partie, qui traite de la Vertu & du Vice en général, contient deux Sections, 
destinées à prouver, l’une, que la différence que nous observons entre le Bien & le Mal 
a By Impressions I mean our stronger perceptions, such as our sensations, affections and 
sentiments; and by Ideas, the fainter perceptions, or the copies of these in the memory and 
imagination. 
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ne dérive pas de la Raison; l’autre, que cette différence découle d’un Sens ou d’un Goût 
Moral, qui est attaché à notre Nature. 
La II. Partie traite de la Justice & de l’Injustice. Elle contient les Sections suivantes. 
Sect. I. Si la Justice est une Vertu naturelle, ou artiﬁcielle. Sect<.> II. De l’Origine de la 
Justice & du Droit de Propriété. Sect. III. Des règles qui fondent la Propriété. Sect. IV. 
Du transport volontaire de la Propriété. Sect. V. De l’Obligation de tenir ses Promesses. 
Sect. VI. Nouvelles réﬂexions sur la Justice & sur l’Injustice. Sect. VII. De l’Origine du 
Gouvernement. Sect. VIII. De la Fidélité due au Gouvernement, & de ses Principes. Sect. 
IX. De sa Mesure. Sect. X. De ses Objets. Sect. XI. Des Loix des Nations. Sect. XII. De 
la Chasteté & de la Modestie. 
La III. Partie, enﬁn, traite des autres Vertus & des autres Vices. Elle est divisée 
en six Sections. Sect. I. De l’Origine des Vertus Naturel-<415> les & des Vices Naturels. 
Sect. II. De la Grandeur d’Ame. Sect. III. De la Bonté & de la Bienveillance. Sect. IV. 
Des Talens Naturels. Sect. V. Quelques Réﬂexions ultérieures sur les Vertus Naturelles. 
Sect. VI. Conclusion de ce Livre. 
Tel est le Plan général de Morale que notre Auteur s’est formé. C’est, à notre 
avis, plutôt une ébauche des principes de l’Art de bien vivre, qu’un Système complet 
& lié dans ses parties. Il pourroit y avoir plus d’ordre, plus de clarté, plus de détail; 
mais aussi, il ne sauroit y avoir plus de paradoxes, plus d’associations singulières 
d’idées & de mots, que personne ne s’étoit encore avisé de joindre; plus d’endroits 
propres à piquer la curiosité des gens qui n’aiment pas les routes battues; & pour 
tout dire enﬁn, plus de pensées neuves & originales. Il faut en tenir compte au 
subtil & ingénieux Anonyme. Non omnis fert omnia tellus. 
Je me garderai bien d’entreprendre ici l’analyse raisonnée d’un Ouvrage si pro-
fond. L’Auteur seul est capable de la faire, & quand il aura eu cette bonté pour le Public, 
il restera à chercher des Lecteurs assez versés dans la Métaphysique, pour être en état 
de le suivre dans les spéculations abstraites dont il leur aura montré le chemin. 
J’avoue ingénument mon ignorance. J’ai été arrêté dès l’entrée de la prémière 
Partie. L’Auteur y agite l’importante question des fondemens & de la différence 
du Juste & de l’Injuste. Le sentiment de CLARKE, qui trouve le principe de cette 
différence dans la Nature & dans l’Or- <416> dre des choses, ne lui plait point. Celui 
de Mr. WOLLASTON, qui prétend que ce qui est conforme à la Vérité des choses, 
mérite par cela même le nom de Justice, lui paroit absurde. En un mot il ne goûte 
rien, de ce qui est le plus goûté sur ce sujet. Selon lui, l’état de la question n’a 
pas été proposé comme il faut, & voici à quoi il le réduit. b Est-ce par le moyen de 
nos idées, ou de leurs impressions, que nous appercevons de la différence entre le Vice 
et & la Vertu, & que nous prononçons qu’une action est ou louable ou blâmable? Un 
Disciple de CLARKE ou de WOLLASTON répondroit, que c’est par nos idées que nous 
jugeons de cette différence, & que c’est uniquement par-là que nous pouvons 
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en juger. Mais notre Auteur est bien éloigné de le penser de la sorte. Rappellant 
ici les notions qu’il a données de la Raison humaine dans son second Livre, c il 
soutient que cette Raison étant un principe sans vie & sans activité, elle est in-
capable d’exciter en nous aucune passion, ou de nous pousser à aucune action: 
d’où il conclud que nos idées ne sauroient être le principe des règles de notre 
conduite. Laissons-le parler lui-même, & abandonnons au commun des Lecteurs 
le soin de l’entendre. 
« La Raison, dit-il, d c’est la découverte du Vrai & du Faux. Le Vrai consiste 
dans une convenance, soit avec les rélations réelles des idées, soit avec 
l’existence réelle des choses en matière de fait; & le Faux consiste <417> 
précisément dans le contraire. Par conséquent tout ce qui n’est point 
susceptible de cette convenance ou de cette disconvenance, ne pouvant 
être ni Vrai ni Faux, ne sauroit être l’objet de notre Raison. Or il est évident 
que nos Passions, nos Volitions & nos Actions n’en sont pas susceptibles, 
parce qu’elles sont des faits originaux & des réalités originales, qui exis­
tent chacune à part indépendamment de toute autre Passion, de toute 
autre Volition, de toute autre Action. Donc on ne sauroit les dire vraies 
ou fausses, conformes ou contraires à la Raison. Elles sont ou louables ou 
blâmables, mais il y auroit de l’absurdité à les appeller raisonnables ou 
déraisonnables . . . . . . . Si e je me trompe en croyant que certains objets 
peuvent me donner du plaisir ou me causer de la douleur, si je m’égare 
dans le choix des moyens que j’emploie pour satisfaire mes desirs, je suis 
à plaindre, mais je ne suis point à blâmer. Telles erreurs ne font aucune 
tache à mon caractère . . . elles n’ont pas la moindre inﬂuence sur ce qu’on 
appelle Vice ou Vertu. . . . On objectera f peut-être, que si l’erreur de Fait ne 
peut jamais passer pour criminelle, il n’en est pas de même de l’erreur de 
Droit, & que cette dernière peut visiblement être une source d’immoralité 
ou de Vice. Mais je nie que l’erreur de Droit, non plus que l’autre, puisse 
jamais être la <418> source originale de quelque chose de vicieux, parce 
qu’elle suppose déja quelque chose de droit & quelque chose d’injuste, 
antérieurement au jugement qu’on en porte. D’où il suit, que si une erreur 
de droit entraine après elle quelque sorte d’immoralité, ce ne peut être 
qu’une immoralité dérivée de quelque autre qui existoit antécédemment 
à l’erreur elle-même ». 
c Liv. II. Part. III. Sect<.> III.

d Pag. 6. 

e Pag. 9.

f Pag. 10.
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Le grand argument, qui détermine notre Auteur à rejetter la pensée de ceux qui 
trouvent dans les rélations nécessaires des choses, les fondemens de la distinction 
du Juste & de l’Injuste, c’est non seulement, qu’il ne peut jamais résulter de-là des 
obligations proprement dites, mais seulement de simples motifs de convenance, 
pour déterminer à agir d’une façon plutôt que d’une autre; c’est sur tout, que si le 
Juste & l’Injuste découloient de l’observation & du violement de certains devoirs, 
nécessairement attachés à telles ou telles rélations, par-tout ou ces rélations au­
roient lieu, l’observation de ces devoirs pourroit être exigée, & seroit une vertu, 
tandis que leur violement seroit un crime. Or le contraire lui semble entièrement 
démontré par une réﬂéxion, qui, sans être nouvelle, prend un air de nouveauté 
dans ses mains, par la manière dont il la propose. La voici. C’est que les Brutes, & 
même les Créatures inanimées, se trouvent quelquefois dans des rélations toutes 
semblables à celles où les Créatures raisonnables se rencontrent, sans que personne 
s’avise pour cela de soutenir qu’en conséquence de ces <419> rélations, elles ont de 
semblables devoirs à remplir, & qu’elles sont coupables quand elles les violent. 
Par exemple, g il n’est point de crime plus énorme que le Parricide. Mais d’où vient 
<que> le Parricide est-il un crime si énorme? Est-ce à cause de la rélation que la 
naissance a formée entre un Fils & un Père? Il est aisé de le savoir. 
« Supposons qu’un Chêne ou qu’un Orme laissent tomber à leurs pieds 
quelques-unes de leurs graines, & que de-là il s’élève de jeunes Arbres, 
qui s’étendant peu à peu étouffent enﬁn ceux à qui ils devoient leur 
existence. Je demande si ce cas n’offre pas à nos yeux les mêmes réla­
tions violées, que dans le cas du Parricide? J’y vois un Arbre produit, 
qui étouffe un autre Arbre duquel il tenoit la vie, précisément comme 
lorsqu’un Enfant tue son Père. Dira-t-on que l’Arbre n’a ni connoissance, 
ni choix? Eh qu’importe? Ce n’est pas la volonté ou la liberté, qui forment 
entre un Père & un Fils, la rélation de Fils & de Père: c’est la génération; 
& cette génération forme aussi précisément la même rélation entre un 
Orme, & un Ormeau produit de la graine du prémier. C’est la volonté 
ou la liberté, qui détermine un homme à tuer son Père: de même ce sont 
les loix du mouvement, qui déterminent un Ormeau à s’élever pour 
étouffer l’Orme qui l’a produit. Ici, en un mot, la même rélation a bien 
de différentes causes, mais elle demeure toujours la même rélation.<420> 
Par conséquent, puisqu’elle ne produit pas le même effet, dans l’Homme 
& dans l’Arbre, elle ne sauroit être regardée comme le principe du crime, 
que le prémier commet en devenant le meurtrier de son Père; ou pour 
dire la même chose en d’autres termes, ce n’est pas pour l’avoir violée, 
que le Parricide est criminel ». 
g Pag. 20. 
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« Prenons un exemple qui soit encore plus sensible. Je voudrois savoir d’où 
vient que l’Inceste passe pour un crime si abominable, parmi les hommes, 
& qu’on n’y attache pas la moindre idée de turpitude, quand c’est une bête 
qui le commet? Répondra-t-on que c’est parce qu’un Animal brute n’a 
pas assez de Raison pour découvrir la turpitude de ce crime, au-lieu que 
l’Homme a toutes les lumières nécessaires pour l’appercevoir? . . . Ce seroit 
tomber dans un cercle vicieux, car alors on supposeroit qu’il y a quelque 
turpitude dans la nature des choses, avant que la Raison la découvre; 
qu’ainsi la turpitude est indépendante des décisions de la Raison, qu’elle 
en est l’objet, mais qu’elle n’en est point l’effet, . . . & que par conséquent, 
quoique les Animaux n’aient pas un degré de Raison sufﬁsant pour dé­
couvrir les devoirs qui découlent de certaines rélations, c’est assez qu’ils 
se trouvent eux-mêmes dans ces rélations, pour être soumis à ces devoirs 
& obligés à les remplir ». 
Or cette conclusion est absurde: par conséquent le principe qui y mène est in­
soutenable, & jamais on ne provera que l’Homme soit juste entant qu’il agit d’une 
ma- <421> nière assortie aux rélations que sa Raison découvre entre les autres Etres 
& lui. Notre Auteur ne craint point de dire que cet argument est sans replique, & 
ce n’est pas à nous à le lui contester. 
On demandera sans doute, en quoi cet habile Métaphysicien fait donc consister 
la Vertu ou le Vice d’une Action. La question est des plus graves. Il y répond aussi 
en détail, dans la Section II. de cette I. Partie, & même dès la ﬁn de la I. Section. 
« Lors, dit-il, h que nous décidons qu’une action est mauvaise, ou qu’un 
caractère est vicieux, cela ne signiﬁe autre chose, sinon que par une 
suite de la constitution de notre nature, nous ne pouvons y réﬂéchir, 
sans éprouver en nous un sentiment qui nous porte à les blâmer. Il en 
est donc du Vice & des Vertus, comme des qualités sensibles, des sons, 
des couleurs, du chaud & du froid, &c. Ces qualités ne sont proprem­
ent que des perceptions de notre Ame. Elles n’existent point dans les 
objets. On ne les y apperçoit point à force de raisonner: on les sent. De 
même, i ce qu’il y a de Moral dans les actions humaines, ne se décou­
vre pas par la voie de la réﬂéxion, mais par celle du sentiment: si l’on 
en juge d’une autre manière, c’est que ce sentiment est si prompt, si 
délicat, si subtil, qu’on le confond par habitude avec les idées qu’il fait 
naitre ensuite ». 
h Pag. 24. 
i Pag. 26. 
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En un mot, suivant notre Auteur, l’Ame <422> a un Goût aussi-bien que le Corps, 
& ce Goût lui sert à distinguer ce qui est juste d’avec ce qui est injuste, de la même 
manière qu’au prémier coup d’œil on distingue ce qui est beau d’avec ce qui est 
laid. C’est une affaire de sentiment: le raisonnement n’y entre pour rien. 
Que si l’on veut savoir en quoi consiste la différence des impressions que le 
Juste fait sur ce Goût spirituel, d’avec celles qu’y fait l’Injuste, on n’a pour s’en in­
struire qu’à rentrer en soi-même. Ce qui est Juste fait plaisir, on l’approuve; ce qui 
est Injuste fait de la peine, on le blâme. Voilà la clé de tout le mystère! Enﬁn si l’on 
n’est pas content, & qu’on demande encore, d’où vient cette diversité d’effets, & 
pourquoi la Vertu produit en nous un sentiment de Plaisir, tandis que le Vice porte 
dans l’Ame un sentiment de douleur? notre savant Métaphysicien répond, que 
cette diversité d’effets vient de différentes causes, les unes Naturelles, & les autres 
Artiﬁcielles; & après avoir bien subtilisé sur ces termes, il renvoie à s’expliquer dans 
la suite, sur les idées précises qu’il y attache. Ce n’est pas pourtant sans conclurre, 
qu’on a grand tort de dire, généralement parlant, que la Vertu est une chose na­
turelle à l’Homme. Puisqu’il y a des Vertus artiﬁcielles, elles ne sont pas toutes 
naturelles, & un bon Philosophe doit en savoir faire la différence. 
Dans le langage vulgaire, tout ce qu’on vient de lire se réduit, si je ne me 
trompe, à ceci; que pour s’exprimer avec exactitude sur la différence du Juste & 
de l’Injuste, il faut poser l’état de <423> la question en ces termes: Pourquoi notre 
Ame, à la simple vue de certaines actions, est-elle touchée d’un sentiment de plai­
sir qui les lui fait approuver; au-lieu qu’à la vue d’autres actions, elle est touchée 
d’un sentiment contraire? Bien des gens se contenteroient de répondre, que c’est 
parce que nous sommes ainsi faits: mais, au gré de notre Auteur, cela n’est pas as­
sez Philosophique. Il faut répondre, que la chose se passe de cette manière, parce 
que notre Ame, outre ses autres facultés, a un Goût spirituel, qui lui est naturel en 
partie, mais qui est aussi en partie artiﬁciel, c’est-à-dire, qui est en partie une suite 
de la constitution de notre nature, & en partie le fruit de l’éducation, de l’exemple, 
des conventions & des constitutions humaines. A l’aide de ce Goût, notre Ame 
s’apperçoit d’abord, par le plaisir ou par la douleur qu’elle éprouve, de ce qui est 
moralement bon & moralement mauvais; & ainsi, parfaitement dispensée de rai­
sonner, ce sentiment lui sufﬁt pour se déterminer surement à embrasser la Vertu 
& à fuir le Vice. 
Voilà tout le Système de notre Auteur. Quand Mr. HUTCHESON le proposa dans 
ses j Recherches sur l’origine des Idées que nous avons de la Vertu & du Bien moral, 
d’habiles gens y trouvérent trois grands défauts. Prémièrement, ils ne goûtérent 
point cette supposition d’une nouvelle Faculté spirituelle, uniquement destinée 
<424> à mettre notre Ame en état de discerner le Juste & l’Injuste: ils la regardérent 
comme absolument inutile, & ils soutinrent que l’Ame, par la faculté qu’elle a 
jAn Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue and Moral Good. 8°. 
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incontestablement de réﬂéchir & de sentir, est sufﬁsamment pourvue de tout ce 
qui lui est nécessaire pour distinguer le bien d’avec le mal. Secondement ils observé­
rent, que dans ce Système on confond la perception des objets, avec les sentimens 
qui en résultent; & Monsr. BURNET ﬁt là-dessus des objections k qui jusqu’à présent 
sont demeurées sans replique. Troisièmement enﬁn, ils ne dissimulérent pas, que 
ce Goût spirituel, ou ce Sentiment moral, comme on voudra l’appeller, tient visible­
ment au Fanatisme, & peut au moins très aisément ouvrir la porte aux excès de 
l’Enthousiasme. Le Dr. BERCKLEY <sic> l poussa vivement cette difﬁculté dans son 
Alciphron, & ﬁt toucher au doigt, qu’il n’y auroit rien de si arbitraire que les idées 
du Juste & de l’Injuste, si elles dépendoient de ce Goût intérieur. Je ne sai d’où 
vient que notre Auteur n’a pas trouvé à propos d’examiner les objections de ces 
Savans. Elles auroient ouvert un beau champ à ses spéculations, & à sa profonde 
Métaphysique. Peut-être est ce modestie, peut-être aussi est ce prudence. Comment 
renchérir en effet sur les <425> efforts de génie, que Mr. HUTCHESON avoit opposés aux 
réﬂexions de Mr. BURNET sur cette matière? 
Quoi qu’il en soit, c’est sur la supposition d’un Sens ou d’un Goût spirituel, que 
toute la Morale de l’ingénieux Anonyme est fondée; & d’abord ce qu’il en conclud, m 
c’est que la Vertu tire tout son prix, non du sentiment qu’on a de son devoir, mais 
des motifs qui y portent. Pourquoi y a-t-il du mérite à être juste, à restituer, par 
exemple, un dépôt que l’on a reçu? Ce n’est certainement pas l’action elle-même 
qui en fait la Justice; c’est la ﬁn qu’on s’y propose, c’est le motif qui y engage. Et 
quel est-il ce motif? Est-ce l’amour du bien public? Est-ce l’utilité particulière? 
Est-ce quelque autre principe général, qui découle de la constitution de la Nature 
humaine, & dont tous les hommes soient affectés? Jusqu’ici, les Philosophes & les 
Jurisconsultes avoient cru l’un ou l’autre; mais ils se sont fort trompés, au jugement 
de notre Auteur. Le sentiment qu’on a de la Justice & de l’Injustice ne découle point, 
à ce qu’il prétend, de la manière dont nous sommes faits. 
« Il ne nait en nous, dit-il, n qu’artiﬁciellement, quoique nécessairement, 
de l’éducation & des conventions que les hommes ont faites entre eux . . 
. . . Ainsi la Justice n’est dans le fond qu’une Vertu artiﬁcielle, encore que 
ses règles ne soient nullement arbitraires ». 
k LETTERS between the late Mr. GILBERT BURNET and Mr. HUTCHESON, concerning the true founda­
tion of VIRTUE &c. 8. Lond 1735. Jamais Controverse Philosophique n’a été traitée de part & 
d’autre avec plus d’esprit, de candeur & de politesse, que dans ces Lettres de Mrs. BURNET 
& HUTCHESON. On peut hardiment les donner pour modèle parfait en ce genre. 
l ALCIPHRON, ou le petit Philosophe. Dialog. III. 
m Part. II. Sect. I. pag. 40. 
n Pag. 48, 49. 
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Pour éclaircir ces ténèbres, l’Auteur exa-<426> mine plus particulièrement, o 
quelle est l’Origine de la Justice & du Droit de Propriété, & là-dessus il se propose deux 
questions importantes. Prémièrement, dit-il, il faut voir « de quelle manière les 
règles de la Justice ont été établies par l’artiﬁce des hommes; & secondement, quelles 
sont les raisons qui nous déterminent à attacher à l’observation de ces règles des 
idées de Beauté morale, au lieu que nous en regardons le violement comme quelque 
chose de laid & de difforme », que nous ne saurions raisonnablement aimer. 
La prémière de ces deux questions l’occupe beaucoup. Il juge, p « que les règles 
de la Justice doivent leur origine à des conventions humaines, destinées à remédier 
à quelques inconvéniens qui naissent du concours de certaines qualités de l’Ame, & 
de la situation des objets extérieurs. Ces qualités, ajoute-t-il, sont l’amour-propre, & 
une générosité bornée. La situation des objets extérieurs, c’est leur inconstance, jointe 
à leur rareté en comparaison de nos desirs & de nos besoins ». Quel langage! Tout 
cela signiﬁe, selon les principes de notre Auteur, que les hommes s’étant réunis 
en <427> Société, ont établi des Loix, dont leur intérêt mutuel a été la base; & que 
ces Loix sont tellement les règles de la Justice, qu’antérieurement à elles, il n’y 
avoit rien de semblable au droit de Propriété, ni par conséquent à ce qu’on appelle 
Justice ou Injustice. C’est, comme on voit, le Système de HOBBES habillé dans un 
goût nouveau. Si ce Philosophe l’avoit produit de cette façon, je doute qu’on lui 
eût fait tant d’accueil dans le Monde. 
Mais en voilà plus qu’il n’en faut pour donner une idée de la Morale du profond 
Auteur de toutes les belles découvertes, que le Traité sur la Nature Humaine contient. 
Nous n’oserions le suivre plus loin, parce que nous nous sentons incapables de saisir 
toujours précisément sa pensée, & plus encore de le rendre intelligible sans y faire 
de trop grands efforts. Le plus sûr est de renvoyer à l’Ouvrage même les Lecteurs 
curieux de subtilités & d’abstractions métaphysiques. Si l’Auteur vouloit y ajouter 
un Glossaire, il leur épargneroit bien du travail. 
III. The Translation 
In the translation that follows the notes of the reviewer appear as footnotes 
ﬂagged by upper-case letters paralleling the lower-case letters used in the foregoing 
transcription of the original text. Our glosses on these notes are enclosed within 
square brackets, while our own notes to the review appear as endnotes ﬂagged by 
o Part. <II.> Sect. II. pag. 50. 
p Pag<.> 67. Voici les paroles mêmes de l’Auteur: These are intended as a remedy to some 
inconveniences, w<h>ich proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human Mind, 
with the situation of external objects. The Qualities of the Mind are selﬁsheness <sic> and 
limited generosity: And the situation of the external objects, is their easy change, join’d to 
their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men. 
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arabic numerals. Page numbers of the original text appear within angle brackets, 
superscript, just as they do in the transcription above. 
ARTICLE VIII 
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, being an attempt to introduce the experimental Method 
of reasoning into Moral Subjects, Volume III. 
That is, 
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE in which an attempt is made to introduce the Experimental 
Method of reasoning into Moral Subjects. V. III On Morals, 310 pages including an Ap­
pendix containing clariﬁcations of some passages from the ﬁrst two Volumes. London, 
by Thomas Longman, 1740 large Octavo.78 
This is the third part of a book of which the preceding two, on the Understanding, 
and the Passions have been published, as we have said in vol. 24 of this journal. 
The author here puts the ﬁnishing touches to his plan. He treats of those matters 
of the most concern to the happiness of man.<412> Since these matters are intended 
to be understood by everyone, he has taken care to express himself in a more intel­
ligible manner than he has done in the preceding volumes. 
“It is proper,” he says in a short advertisement, “that the public know that 
this third part of the Treatise on Human Nature is in some ways indepen­
dent of the ﬁrst two, and that one can very easily understand it without 
being initiated into the abstract reasonings of the two others. I do not 
doubt that ordinary readers will understand the principles, provided that 
they give it the same attention that one gives to all works of this kind. 
It is only necessary to remember that I always use the terms impressions 
and ideas in the same sense, and that by A impressions I mean lively and 
strong perceptions, such as are our affections, our sensations, and our 
sentiments, while by ideas I only mean languishing and weak perceptions, 
or the copies of those others in the memory and in the imagination.” 
We wish with all our heart that the public judges of things as the author 
hopes, but not without fearing that ordinary readers may again complain that his 
metaphysics is a little obscure, and that he could have shed more light on it. It is 
sometimes <413> unfortunate to have too much genius and penetration. If one does 
not bring oneself near enough to the level of the vulgar, one is not understood, 
and it is wholly in vain that one delivers to them all these speculations, for they 
A “By Impressions I mean our stronger perceptions, such as our sensations, affections and 
sentiments; and by Ideas the fainter perceptions, or the copies of these in the memory and 
imagination.” 
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do not perceive those beauties too sublime for them. Nevertheless, when one 
hopes to reform the ideas of almost all humankind, and to open paths new even 
to the eyes of philosophers, it would be only natural to forge ﬁrst of all a language 
that is simple and clear, which everyone could easily understand. Without this it 
is impossible to communicate one’s ideas, and even more difﬁcult to have them 
appreciated. Morals especially must be taught with the greatest simplicity. A 
metaphysician who undertakes to demonstrate the principles of natural right by 
making them abstract wastes his time and effort. Few people can appreciate his 
work, and almost no one beneﬁts. I do not even know whether this method is 
not really harmful to religion, in spite of the intention of the philosophers that 
use it. We know that the heart constantly seeks pretexts for avoiding obedience. 
Is there any more plausible pretext than that drawn from the obscurity of books 
intended to teach the elements of virtue? Is it to make these praiseworthy that 
they are made so difﬁcult? Is this not, on the contrary, the means of making them 
forever distasteful? 
We limit ourselves, as can be seen, to elucidating the ideas of the author of 
this treatise. We are obliged to grant that he <414> has really made an effort to ac­
commodate himself to the capacity of a greater number of people. He has not only 
sometimes taken care to clarify his principles by using popular examples; he has 
as well often added notes to the text, and these notes, at least most of them, truly 
do shed some light on it. 
This third book is divided into three parts, of which this is the plan. 
Part I, which treats of Virtue and Vice in general, contains two sections, one of 
which is intended to prove that the difference that we observe between Good and Evil 
does not derive from Reason; the other, that this difference follows from a Sense or Moral 
Taste that is implanted in our nature. 
Part II treats Of Justice and Injustice. It contains the following sections. 
Sect. I. Whether Justice is a natural, or an artiﬁcial Virtue. Sect. II. Of the Origins 
of Justice and the Right to Property. Sect. III. Of the rules that found Property. Sect. 
IV. Of the voluntary transference of Property. Sect. V. Of the Obligation to keep one’s 
Promises. Sect. VI. New reﬂections on Justice and Injustice. Sect VII. Of the Origin of 
Government. Sect VIII. Of the Allegiance due to Government, and of its Principles. Sect. 
IX. Of its Measure. Sect. X. Of its Objects. Sect. XI. Of the Laws of Nations. Sect XII. 
Of Chastity and Modesty. 
Part III, ﬁnally, treats the other Virtues and other Vices. It is divided into six 
sections. Sect. I. Of the Origin of the Natural Virtues <415> and the Natural Vices. Sect. 
II. Of Greatness of Mind. Sect. III. Of Goodness and Benevolence. Sect IV. Of Natural 
Abilities. Sect V. Some farther Reﬂections concerning the Natural Virtues. Sect. VI. 
Conclusion of this Book. 
Such is the general plan of morals that our author has devised. It is, in our 
opinion, more an outline of the principles of the art of living well than a complete 
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and well-connected system. It could have more order, more clarity, more detail; but 
also, it could scarcely contain more paradoxes, more singular associations of ideas 
and words that no one ever thought of putting together before; a greater number 
of passages likely to arouse the curiosity of people who dislike the usual paths; and, 
in a word, a greater number of new and original thoughts. It is necessary to grant 
that to the subtle and ingenious author. Non omnis fert omnia tellus.79 
I will refrain from undertaking here the reasoned analysis of such a profound 
work. The author alone is capable of doing this, and when he has done this favour 
for the public, there will still be wanting readers well-enough versed in metaphysics 
to be able to follow him in the path of the abstract speculations which he would 
show them. 
I candidly admit my ignorance. I was stopped at the beginning of the ﬁrst 
part. The author raises there the important question of the foundation of, and 
the difference between, right and wrong [du Juste & de l’Injuste]. The sentiment of 
Clarke, who ﬁnds the principle of this distinction in the nature and order <416> of 
things, does not please him. That of Mr. Wollaston, who claims that that which 
conforms to the truth of things, for this reason deserves the name of right [Justice], 
he ﬁnds absurd. In a word, he approves none of what is most approved on this sub­
ject. According to him, the state of the question has not been properly proposed. 
Here is what he reduces it to: B Is it by means of our ideas, or of their impressions, 
that we perceive the difference between vice and virtue, and that we pronounce that an 
action is either praiseworthy or blameable? A disciple of Clarke or of Wollaston would 
answer that it is by means of our ideas that we judge of this difference, and that it 
is exclusively thus that we can judge of it. But our author is very far from thinking 
in this way. Recalling here the account of human reason he has presented in his 
second book, C he holds that this reason, being a lifeless and an inactive principle, 
is incapable of exciting any passion in us, or of inciting us to perform any action: 
hence he concludes that our ideas could not be the foundation [principe] of the 
rules of our conduct. Let him speak himself and leave to common readers the task 
of understanding. 
“Reason,” he says, D “is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth con­
sists in an agreement, either with the real relations of ideas, or with the 
real existence of things in matters of fact; and falsehood consists <417> in 
precisely the contrary. Consequently, all that is not susceptible of this 
agreement or of this disagreement, being incapable of being either true 
B Page 4.

C Bk. II. Part III. Sect. III.

D Page 6 [Treatise 3.1.1.9; SBN 438].
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or false, could not possibly be the object of our reason. Now it is evident 
that our passions, our volitions, and our actions are not [thus] susceptible, 
because they are original facts and original realities, each of which exists 
separately, independently of all other passion, of all other volition, of all 
other action. Thus one could not call them true or false, conforming or 
contrary to reason. They are either laudable or blameable, but it would be 
absurd to call them reasonable or unreasonable. . . . If E I am mistaken in 
believing that certain objects can give me pleasure or cause me pain, if I 
get lost in choosing the means that I use to satisfy my desires, I am to be 
lamented, but I am not to blame. Such errors cannot blemish my character 
. . . they do not have the least inﬂuence on what is called vice or virtue. 
. . . Someone objects,F perhaps, that if a mistake of fact can never be taken 
as criminal, it is not the same with a mistake of right, and that this latter 
can clearly be a source of immorality or of vice. But I deny that a mistake 
of right, any more than the other, could ever be the <418> original source 
of something vicious, because it already supposes something right and 
something unjust, prior to the judgement that one makes of it. Hence it 
follows that if a mistake of right brings with it some kind of immorality, 
it can only be an immorality derived from some other that exists prior 
to the mistake itself.” 
The great argument that determines our author to reject the view of those who 
ﬁnd in the necessary relations of things the foundation of the distinction between 
right and wrong, is not only that obligations, properly speaking, can never result 
from these relations, but only mere motives of agreement80 for determining one 
course of action rather than another. It is, above all, that if right and wrong derive 
from the observance and breach of certain duties, necessarily attached to such 
and such relations, then wherever these relations took place the observance of 
these duties would be required, and would be a virtue, while their breach would 
be a crime. But the contrary seems to the author fully demonstrated by a consid­
eration which, without being new, in his hands takes on an air of novelty, because 
of the way in which he presents it. Here it is. It is that brutes and even inanimate 
creatures sometimes ﬁnd themselves in relations completely like those in which 
reasonable creatures ﬁnd themselves, but without anyone taking it into his head 
to claim that, in consequence of these <419> relations, they have the same duties to 
fulﬁl, and that they are guilty when they breach them. For example, G there is no 
crime more outrageous than parricide. But how comes it about <that> parricide 
E Page 9 [Treatise 3.1.1.12; SBN 459–60]. 
F Page 10 [Treatise 3.1.1.14; SBN 460]. 
G Page 20 [Treatise 3.1.1.24; SBN 467–68]. 
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is such an outrageous crime? Is it because of the relation that birth has formed 
between a son and a father? It is easy to know this. 
“Suppose that an oak or an elm drop some of their seeds at their feet, and 
that from these young trees rise up, which, growing little by little, ﬁnally 
stiﬂe those to which they owe their existence. I ask whether this case does 
not offer to our eyes the same breached relations as in the case of parricide? 
I see here a tree produced, that stiﬂes another tree from which it derived 
its existence, precisely as when a child kills his father. Does someone say 
that the tree has neither knowledge nor choice? Of what import is that? 
It is not the will or freedom that forms between a father and a son the 
relation of son and father: it is generation; and this generation forms also 
precisely the same relation between an elm and a young elm produced 
from the seed of the former. It is the will or freedom that determines a 
man to kill his father: just as they are the laws of motion that determine 
a young elm to grow up to stiﬂe the elm that produced it. Here, in a word, 
the same relation has certainly different causes, but it remains always 
the same relation. <420> In consequence, since this does not produce the 
same effect in man and in trees, it should not be regarded as the source 
[principe] of the crime that the former commits by becoming the murderer 
of his father: or, to say the same thing in other terms, it is not for having 
violated it that parricide is criminal.” 
“Let us take an even more tangible example. I would like to know how it 
comes about that incest is considered so abominable a crime, among men, 
while not the least idea of turpitude is attached to it when it is an animal 
that commits it? Does someone reply that it is because a brute animal does 
not have enough reason to discover the turpitude of this crime, while a 
man has all the light required to perceive it? . . . This would be to fall into 
a vicious circle, for then one would suppose that there is some turpitude 
in the nature of things, before reason discovers it; that, thus, the turpitude 
is independent of the decisions of reason, that it is the object, but not the 
effect of it . . . and that in consequence, even if animals have not a degree 
of reason sufﬁcient to discover the duties which follow certain relations, 
it is enough that they ﬁnd themselves in these relations, in order to be 
bound by these duties and obliged to fulﬁl them.” 
But this conclusion is absurd: in consequence, the principle that governs it is 
untenable. Moreover, it will never be proved that man is right insofar as he acts 
<421> in a manner conforming to the relations that reason discovers between other 
beings and himself. Our author does not hesitate to say that there is to this argu­
ment no reply, and it is not for us to dispute his claim. 
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It will be asked, no doubt, in what, according to this skillful metaphysician, 
does the virtue or the vice of an action consist. The question is one of the most 
serious. He also responds to it in detail in section 2 of part 1, and even already at 
the end of section 1. 
“When, he says, H we pronounce that an action is evil, or some character 
is vicious, this signiﬁes nothing more than that as a consequence of the 
constitution of our nature, we cannot reﬂect on it without feeling in 
ourselves a sentiment that leads us to blame them. It is thus of vice and of 
the virtues as of the sensible qualities, of sounds, of colours, of heat and 
of cold, etc. These qualities are properly only perceptions of our mind. 
They do not exist in the objects. We do not perceive them by means of 
reasoning: we feel them. Likewise I whatever is moral in human actions 
is discovered not through the path of reﬂection, but through that of 
sentiment. If we think it otherwise it is only because this sentiment is so 
quick, so gentle, so subtle, that we customarily confound it with the ideas 
that it generates afterwards.” 
In a word, according to our author, the mind, <422> as much as the body, has a 
taste, and this taste helps it to distinguish that which is right from that which is 
wrong, in the same manner as we at ﬁrst glance distinguish that which is beautiful 
from that which is ugly. It is a matter of sentiment: reasoning has no place in it. 
If one wishes to know what the difference is between the impressions that right 
makes on this mental taste, and those made by wrong, one can instruct oneself 
only by returning into oneself. What is right gives pleasure and is approved; what is 
wrong produces pain and is blamed. There is the key to the whole mystery! Finally, 
if one is not satisﬁed and asks again, whence comes this diversity of effects, and 
why virtue causes in us a sentiment of pleasure, while vice brings to the mind a 
sentiment of pain? our learned metaphysician answers, that this diversity of effects 
comes from different causes, some natural, the others artiﬁcial, and, after a great 
deal of hair splitting over these terms, he postpones the explanation of the precise 
ideas he attaches to them. It is not, however, without concluding that it is a great 
mistake, generally speaking, to say that virtue is something natural to man. Since 
there are artiﬁcial virtues, they are not all natural, and a good philosopher must 
know how to distinguish them. 
In ordinary language, what we have just read amounts, if I am not mistaken, 
to this. In order to express with precision the difference between right and wrong, 
it is necessary to state <423> the question in these terms. Why is it that our mind, 
H Page 24 [Treatise 3.1.1.26; SBN 469]. 
I Page 26 [Treatise 3.1.2.1; SBN 470]. 
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on a simple view of certain actions, is touched by a sentiment of pleasure that 
makes it approve them, whereas on the view of other actions it is touched by a 
contrary sentiment? Many people would be satisﬁed to reply that it is because we 
are so made, but for the liking of our author, this is not philosophical enough. It 
is necessary to say that things happen in this way because our mind, besides its 
other faculties, has a mental taste that is partly natural to it, but also partly artiﬁ­
cial—that is to say, which in part follows from the constitution of our nature, and 
in part is the product of education, example, conventions and of human laws [des 
constitutions humaines]. With the help of this taste our mind notices at once, by 
the pleasure or pain it experiences, that which is morally good and morally bad, 
and thus, entirely spared from reasoning, this sentiment sufﬁces for it to choose, 
without doubt, to embrace virtue and avoid vice. 
That is the whole system of our author. When Mr. Hutcheson proposed it in 
his Recherches sur l’origine des Idées que nous avons de la Vertu & du Bien moral, J able 
people found in it three great ﬂaws. Firstly, they did not approve of this supposi­
tion of a new mental faculty, intended only <424> to enable our mind to discern 
right from wrong. They saw this as absolutely useless, and claimed that the mind, 
given its indisputable capacity to reﬂect and sense, is adequately furnished with 
all that is necessary for it to distinguish good from evil. Secondly, they observed 
that in this system the perception of objects is confounded with the sentiments 
that result from these perceptions. On this, Mr. Burnet raised objections that up 
until now have remained unanswered.K Thirdly, and last, they did not conceal that 
this mental taste, or this moral sentiment, whatever one wishes to call it, is clearly 
linked to fanaticism, and can at least very easily open the door to the excesses of 
enthusiasm. Dr. Berkeley sharply exposed this difﬁculty in his Alciphron, L and 
made it clear that nothing would be more arbitrary than the ideas of right and 
wrong if these depended on such an inner taste. I do not understand how it is 
that our author did not ﬁnd it appropriate to examine the objections of these 
scholars. They would have opened a beautiful ﬁeld for his speculations, and for 
his profound metaphysics. Perhaps it is modesty, perhaps even prudence. How can 
one add anything to the <425> ingenious efforts that Mr. Hutcheson has opposed to 
Mr. Burnet’s reﬂections on this topic? 
J An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue and Moral Good. 8°. [The reviewer 
cites, with a minor alteration (“and” for “or”) the English title given to Treatise II of 
Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.] 
K Letters between the late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutcheson, concerning the true foundation 
of Virtue &c. 8°. London, 1735. No philosophical controversy has ever been conducted, 
by both parties, with so much spirit, candour and politeness, as in these letters of 
Messrs. Burnet and Hutcheson. One can without reservation offer them as a perfect 
model for this kind of dispute. 
L Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher. Dialogue III. 
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Be that as it may, it is on the supposition of a sense or mental taste that the 
whole of the morals of our ingenious anonymous author is founded. At the outset 
he concludes that virtue is evaluated,M not according to the sentiment that one has 
of one’s duty, but from the motives leading to it. Why is there any merit in being 
just, in restoring, for example, a loan one has received? The justice of it certainly 
does not lie in the action itself; it is the end that one proposes for oneself; it is the 
motive that engages to it. And what is that motive? Is it the love of public good? Is 
it private utility? Is it some other general principle that derives from the constitu­
tion of human nature and by which all men are affected? Until now, philosophers 
and jurists have believed one or the other; but they are, in the judgement of our 
author, seriously mistaken. The sentiment one has of justice or injustice derives 
not, he claims, from the manner in which we are made. 
“It arises in us, he says, N only artiﬁcially, though necessarily, from edu­
cation and conventions that men have made between themselves. . . . 
Thus, justice is at bottom only an artiﬁcial virtue, even though its rules 
be not at all arbitrary.” 
To clarify these obscurities, the author <426> examines more particularly O the Origin 
of Justice and the Right of Property, and on this matter suggests two important ques­
tions. Firstly, he says, we must see 
“in what manner the rules of justice have been established by the artiﬁce 
of men; and secondly, what are the reasons that determine us to attach to 
the observance of these rules the ideas of moral beauty, while we consider 
the breach of them as something ugly and deformed” 
that we could not reasonably approve. 
He is much concerned with the ﬁrst of these two questions. He judges P 
“that the rules of justice owe their origin to human conventions, intended 
to remedy some inconveniences, which arise from the concurrence of 
certain qualities of the mind, and the situation of external objects. These 
M Part II Sect I. Page 40 [Treatise 3.2.1.7; SBN 479]. 
N Pages 48, 49 [Treatise 3.2.1.17, 19; SBN 483, 484]. 
O Part <II>. Sect II, p.50. [The quoted questions that follow are from Part 2, Sect. 2, of 
Book 3 (3.2.2.1; SBN 484). The reviewer mistakenly cites Part III]. 
P Page 66. [Treatise 3.2.2.16; SBN 494, pages 66–67 in the ﬁrst edition of the Treatise.] 
Here are the exact words of the author: “These are intended as a remedy to some incon­
veniences, w<h>ich proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human 
Mind, with the situation of external objects. The Qualities of the Mind are selﬁsheness 
<sic> and limited generosity: And the situation of the external objects, is their easy change, 
join’d to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men.” 
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qualities, he adds, are self-love and a limited generosity. The situation of 
external objects, is their inconstancy, joined to their scarcity in comparison 
with our desires and our needs.” 
What language! All this means, according to the principles of our author, that 
men, having come together in <427> society, have established laws based on their 
mutual interest, and that these laws are so much the rules of justice that, prior to 
them, there was nothing like the right of property or, in consequence, that which 
we call justice or injustice. This, as one can see, is Hobbes’s system clothed in a new 
fashion. Had that philosopher brought it forward in this manner, I doubt that he 
would have had such a reception in the world. 
But this is indeed more than is necessary to give an idea of the morals of the 
profound author of all the beautiful discoveries contained in the Treatise of Human 
Nature. We would not dare to follow him farther, for we feel incapable of always 
grasping his meaning precisely, and even more of making it intelligible without 
making too great an effort. The most sure [course] is to send readers curious about 
metaphysical subtleties and abstractions to the book itself. Were the author willing 
to add a glossary, he could spare his readers much work. 
IV. Comparisons 
(A) In order to show the signiﬁcant differences between the sense of the Trea­
tise as presented by the reviewer’s translated quotations of it and Hume’s original 
texts, we here present three-column comparisons of three relatively lengthy 
French “quotations” of Treatise 3 found in the Bibliothèque raisonnée review, then 
our back-translations of these “quotations,” and lastly, the versions of these texts 
found in the Treatise.81 
Translations of Hume’s 
text 
<416> « La Raison . . . c’est la 
découverte du Vrai & du 
Faux. Le Vrai consiste dans 
une convenance, soit avec 
les rélations réelles des idées, 
soit avec l’existence réelle des 
choses en matière de fait; & 
le Faux consiste <417> précisé­
ment dans le contraire. Par 
conséquent tout ce qui n’est 
point susceptible de cette 
convenance ou de cette dis­
convenance, ne pouvant être 
ni Vrai ni Faux, ne sauroit être 
Back-translations 
{3.1.1.9; SBN 458} “Reason 
. . . is the discovery of truth 
and falsehood. Truth con­
sists in an agreement, either 
with the real relations of 
ideas, or with the real exis­
tence of things in matters of 
fact; and falsehood consists 
<417> in precisely the contrary. 
Consequently, all that is not 
susceptible of this agreement 
or of this disagreement, be­
ing incapable of being either 
true or false, could not pos-
Texts of the Treatise82 
[3.1.1.9; SBN 458] “Reason 
is the discovery of truth or 
falshood. Truth or falshood 
consists in an agreement or 
disagreement either to the 
real relations of ideas, or to 
real existence and matter 
of fact. Whatever, there-
fore, is not susceptible of 
this agreement or disagree­
ment, is incapable of being 
true or false, and can never 
be an object of our reason. 
Now ’tis evident our pas-
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l’objet de notre Raison. Or il 
est évident que nos Passions, 
nos Volitions & nos Actions 
n’en sont pas susceptibles, 
parce qu’elles sont des faits 
originaux & des réalités origi­
nales, qui existent chacune 
à part indépendamment de 
toute autre Passion, de toute 
autre Volition, de toute autre 
Action. Donc on ne sauroit 
les dire vraies ou fausses, 
conformes ou contraires à la 
Raison. Elles sont ou louables 
ou blâmables, mais il y auroit 
de l’absurdité à les appeller 
raisonnables ou déraisonna-
bles83 . . . . . . . Si je me trompe 
en croyant que certains objets 
peuvent me donner du plaisir 
ou me causer de la douleur, si 
je m’égare dans le choix des 
moyens que j’emploie pour 
satisfaire mes desirs, je suis 
à plaindre, mais je ne suis 
point à blâmer. Telles erreurs 
ne font aucune tache à mon 
caractère . . . elles n’ont pas 
la moindre inﬂuence sur ce 
qu’on appelle Vice ou Vertu. 
. . . On objectera peut-être, 
que si l’erreur de Fait ne peut 
jamais passer pour criminelle, 
il n’en est pas de même de 
l’erreur de Droit, & que cette 
dernière peut visiblement être 
une source d’immoralité ou de 
Vice. Mais je nie que l’erreur 
de Droit, non plus que l’autre, 
puisse jamais être la <418> source 
originale de quelque chose de 
vicieux, parce qu’elle suppose 
déja quelque chose de droit 
& quelque chose d’injuste, 
antérieurement au jugement 
qu’on en porte. D’où il suit, 
que si une erreur de droit en­
traine après elle quelque sorte 
d’immoralité, ce ne peut être 
qu’une immoralité dérivée 
de quelque autre qui existoit 
antécédemment à l’erreur 
elle-même ». 
sibly be the object of our 
reason. Now it is evident that 
our passions, our volitions, 
and our actions are not [thus] 
susceptible, because they are 
original facts and original 
realities, each of which exists 
separately, independently of 
all other passion, of all other 
volition, of all other action. 
Thus one could not call them 
true or false, conforming or 
contrary to reason. {3.1.1.10; 
SBN 458} They are either 
laudable or blameable, but 
it would be absurd to call 
them reasonable or unrea­
sonable . . . . . . . {3.1.1.12; 
SBN 459–60} If I am mistaken 
in believing that certain 
objects can give me pleasure 
or cause me pain, if I get lost 
in choosing the means that 
I use to satisfy my desires, I 
am to be lamented, but I am 
not to blame. Such errors 
cannot blemish my character 
. . . they do not have the least 
inﬂuence on what is called 
vice or virtue. . . . {3.1.1.14; 
SBN 460} Someone objects, 
perhaps, that if a mistake 
of fact can never be taken as 
criminal, it is not the same 
with a mistake of right, and 
that this latter can clearly 
be a source of immorality 
or of vice. But I deny that a 
mistake of right, any more 
than the other, could ever 
be the <418> original source of 
something vicious, because it 
already supposes something 
right and something unjust, 
prior to the judgement that 
one makes of it. Hence it fol­
lows that if a mistake of right 
brings with it some kind of 
immorality, it can only be 
an immorality derived from 
some other that exists prior 
to the mistake itself.” 
sions, volitions, and actions, 
are not susceptible of any 
such agreement or disagree­
ment; being original facts 
and realities, compleat in 
themselves, and implying no 
reference to other passions, 
volitions, and actions. ’Tis 
impossible, therefore, they 
can be pronounced either 
true or false, and be either 
contrary or conformable to 
reason. [3.1.1.10; SBN 458] 
Actions may be laudable or 
blameable; but they cannot 
be reasonable or unreason-
able . . . . . . . [3.1.1.12; SBN 
459–60] If I am more to be 
lamented than blam’d, if I 
am mistaken with regard to 
the inﬂuence of objects in 
producing pain or pleasure, 
or if I know not the proper 
means of satisfying my de-
sires. No one can ever regard 
such errors as a defect in my 
moral character. . . . I ask, 
therefore . . . . if it be possible 
to imagine, that such errors 
are the sources of all im­
morality? . . . . [3.1.1.14; SBN 
460] Shou’d it be pretended, 
that tho’ a mistake of fact be 
not criminal, yet a mistake 
of right often is; and that 
this may be the source of 
immorality: I would answer, 
that ’tis impossible such 
a mistake can ever be the 
original source of immoral­
ity, since it supposes a real 
right and wrong; that is, a 
real distinction in morals, 
independent of these judg­
ments. A mistake, therefore, 
of right may become a spe­
cies of immorality; but ’tis 
only a secondary one, and 
is founded on some other, 
antecedent to it.” 
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<419> « Supposons qu’un 
Chêne ou qu’un Orme lais­
sent tomber à leurs pieds 
quelques-unes de leurs 
graines,  & que de-là il  
s’élève de jeunes Arbres, 
qui s’étendant peu à peu 
étouffent enfin ceux à qui 
ils devoient leur existence. 
Je demande si ce cas n’offre 
pas à nos yeux les mêmes 
rélations violées, que dans 
le cas du Parricide? J’y vois 
un Arbre produit, qui étouffe 
un autre Arbre duquel il 
tenoit la vie, précisément 
comme lorsqu’un Enfant 
tue son Père. Dira-t-on que 
l’Arbre n’a ni connoissance, 
ni choix? Eh qu’importe? 
Ce n’est pas la volonté ou 
la liberté, qui forment entre 
un Père & un Fils, la rélation 
de Fils & de Père: c’est la 
génération; & cette généra­
tion forme aussi précisément 
la même rélation entre un 
Orme, & un Ormeau produit 
de la graine du prémier. C’est 
la volonté ou la liberté, qui 
détermine un homme à tuer 
son Père: de même ce sont 
les loix du mouvement, qui 
déterminent un Ormeau à 
s’élever pour étouffer l’Orme 
qui l’a produit. Ici, en un mot, 
la même rélation a bien de 
différentes causes, mais elle 
demeure toujours la même 
rélation. <420> Par conséquent, 
puisqu’elle ne produit pas le 
même effet, dans l’Homme 
& dans l’Arbre, elle ne sau­
roit être regardée comme le 
principe du crime, que le pré­
mier commet en devenant 
le meurtrier de son Père; ou 
pour dire la même chose en 
d’autres termes, ce n’est pas 
pour l’avoir violée, que le 
Parricide est criminal. 
« Prenons un exemple qui 
soit encore plus sensible. Je 
{3.1.1.24; SBN 467}84 “Sup-
pose that an oak or an elm 
drop some of their seeds 
at their feet, and that from 
these young trees rise up, 
which, growing little by 
little, ﬁnally stiﬂe those to 
which they owe their exis­
tence. I ask whether this case 
does not offer to our eyes the 
same breached relations as 
in the case of parricide? I see 
here a tree produced, that sti­
ﬂes another tree from which 
it derived its existence, pre­
cisely as when a child kills 
his father. Does someone 
say that the tree has neither 
knowledge nor choice? Of 
what import is that? It is 
not the will or freedom that 
forms between a father and 
a son the relation of son and 
father: it is generation; and 
this generation forms also 
precisely the same relation 
between an elm and a young 
elm produced from the seed 
of the former. It is the will or 
freedom that determines a 
man to kill his father: just as 
they are the laws of motion 
that determine a young elm 
to grow up to stiﬂe the elm 
that produced it. Here, in a 
word, the same relation has 
certainly different causes, 
but it remains always the 
same relation. <420> In conse­
quence, since this does not 
produce the same effect in 
man and in trees, it should 
not be regarded as the source 
[principe] of the crime that 
the former commits by be-
coming the murderer of his 
father: or, to say the same 
thing in other terms, it is not 
for having violated it that 
parricide is criminal. 
{3.1.1.25; SBN 467–68} “Let 
us take an even more tan­
gible example. I would like 
[3.1.1.24; SBN 467] “let us 
suppose, that by the drop-
ping of its seed, it produces 
a sapling below it, which 
springing up by degrees, at 
last overtops and destroys 
the parent tree: I ask, if in 
this instance there be want­
ing any relation, which is 
discoverable in parricide or 
ingratitude? Is not the one 
tree the cause of the other’s 
existence; and the latter the 
cause of the destruction 
of the former, in the same 
manner as when a child 
murders his parent? ’Tis 
not sufﬁcient to reply, that 
a choice or will is wanting. 
For in the case of parricide, 
a will does not give rise to 
any different relations, but 
is only the cause from which 
the action is deriv’d; and 
consequently produces the 
same relations, that in the 
oak or elm arise from some 
other principles. ’Tis a will 
or choice, that determines 
a man to kill his parent; and 
they are the laws of matter 
and motion, that determine 
a sapling to destroy the oak, 
from which it sprung. Here 
then the same relations have 
different causes; but still the 
relations are the same: And 
as their discovery is not in 
both cases attended with 
a notion of immorality, it 
follows, that that notion 
does not arise from such a 
discovery.” 
[3.1.1.25; SBN 467–68] “But 
to chuse an instance, still 
more resembling; I would 
fain ask any one, why incest 
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voudrois savoir d’où vient 
que l’Inceste passe pour un 
crime si abominable, parmi 
les hommes, & qu’on n’y 
attache pas la moindre idée 
de turpitude, quand c’est 
une bête qui le commet? 
Répondra-t-on que c’est 
parce qu’un Animal brute 
n’a pas assez de Raison pour 
découvrir la turpitude de ce 
crime, au-lieu que l’Homme 
a toutes les lumières néces­
saires pour l’appercevoir? 
. . . Ce seroit tomber dans un 
cercle vicieux, car alors on 
supposeroit qu’il y a quelque 
turpitude dans la nature des 
choses, avant que la Raison 
la découvre; qu’ainsi la tur­
pitude est indépendante des 
décisions de la Raison, qu’elle 
en est l’objet, mais qu’elle 
n’en est point l’effet, . . . & 
que par conséquent, quoique 
les Animaux n’aient pas un 
degré de Raison suffisant 
pour découvrir les devoirs 
qui découlent de certaines 
rélations, c’est assez qu’ils se 
trouvent eux-mêmes dans 
ces rélations, pour être sou­
mis à ces devoirs & obligés à 
les remplir ». 
« Lors . . . que nous décidons 
qu’une action est mau­
vaise, ou qu’un caractère 
est vicieux, cela ne signiﬁe 
autre chose, sinon que par 
une suite de la constitution 
de notre nature, nous ne 
pouvons y réfléchir, sans 
éprouver en nous un senti­
ment qui nous porte à les 
blâmer. Il en est donc du 
Vice & des Vertus, comme 
des qualités sensibles, des 
sons, des couleurs, du chaud 
& du froid, &c. Ces qualités 
ne sont proprement que 
des perceptions de notre 
Ame. Elles n’existent point 
to know how it comes about 
that incest is considered so 
abominable a crime, among 
men, while not the least idea 
of turpitude is attached to 
it when it is an animal that 
commits it? Does someone 
reply that it is because a 
brute animal does not have 
enough reason to discover 
the turpitude of this crime, 
while a man has all the light 
required to perceive it?85 . . . 
This would be to fall into 
a vicious circle, for then 
one would suppose that 
there is some turpitude in 
the nature of things, before 
reason discovers it; that, 
thus, the turpitude is inde­
pendent of the decisions of 
reason, that it is the object, 
but not the effect of it . . . and 
that in consequence, even if 
animals have not a degree of 
reason sufﬁcient to discover 
the duties which follow cer­
tain relations, it is enough 
that they ﬁnd themselves in 
these relations, in order to be 
bound by these duties and 
obliged to fulﬁl them.” 
{3.1.1.26; SBN 469} “When 
. . . we pronounce that an 
action is evil, or some char­
acter is vicious, this signiﬁes 
nothing more than that as 
a consequence of the con­
stitution of our nature, we 
cannot reﬂect on it without 
feeling in ourselves a senti­
ment that leads us to blame 
them. It is thus of vice and 
of the virtues as of the sen­
sible qualities, of sounds, 
of colours, of heat and of 
cold, etc. These qualities are 
properly only perceptions of 
our mind. They do not exist 
in the objects. We do not 
in the human species is crimi­
nal, and why the very same 
action, and the same rela­
tions in animals have not the 
smallest moral turpitude and 
deformity? If it be answer’d, 
that this action is innocent 
in animals, because they have 
not reason sufﬁcient to dis­
cover its turpitude; but that 
man, being endow’d with 
that faculty, which ought 
to restrain him to his duty, 
the same action instantly 
becomes criminal to him. . . 
this is evidently arguing in a 
circle. For before reason can 
perceive this turpitude, the 
turpitude must exist; and 
consequently is independent 
of the decisions of our rea­
son, and is their object more 
properly than their effect. 
. . . Their [“Animals”] want 
of a sufﬁcient degree of rea­
son may hinder them from 
perceiving the duties and 
obligations of morality, but 
can never hinder these du­
ties from existing; since they 
must antecedently exist, in 
order to their being perceiv’d. 
Reason must ﬁnd them, and 
can never produce them.” 
[3.1.1.26; SBN 469] “when 
you pronounce any action or 
character to be vicious, you 
mean nothing, but that from 
the constitution of your 
nature you have a feeling 
or sentiment of blame from 
the contemplation of it. Vice 
and virtue, therefore, may 
be compar’d to sounds, co­
lours, heat and cold, which, 
according to modern phi­
losophy, are not qualities in 
objects, but perceptions in 
the mind: 
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dans les objets. On ne les y 
apperçoit point à force de 
raisonner: on les sent. De 
même, ce qu’il y a de Moral 
dans les actions humaines, 
ne se découvre pas par la 
voie de la réﬂéxion, mais par 
celle du sentiment: si l’on en 
juge d’une autre manière, 
c’est que ce sentiment est si 
prompt, si délicat, si subtil, 
qu’on le confond par habi­
tude avec les idées qu’il fait 
naitre ensuite ». 
perceive them by means of 
reasoning: we feel them.86 
{3.1.2.1; SBN 470} Likewise 
whatever is moral in hu­
man actions is discovered 
not through the path of 
reﬂection, but through that 
of sentiment. If we think it 
otherwise it is only because 
this sentiment is so quick, 
so gentle, so subtle, that we 
customarily confound it 
with the ideas that it gener­
ates afterwards.” 
[3.1.2.1; SBN 470] Morality, 
therefore, is more properly 
felt than judg’d of; tho’ this 
feeling or sentiment is com­
monly so soft and gentle, 
that we are apt to confound 
it with an idea, according to 
our common custom of tak­
ing all things for the same, 
which have any near resem­
blance to each other.” 
(B) These comparisons show important differences between the sense of the 
Norton-Perinetti translation and the Maury translation, leaving it to the reader 
to determine which of these translations is more accurate. 
Bibliothèque raisonnée 
text 
<415> « Tel est le Plan général 
de Morale que notre Auteur 
s’est formé. C’est, à notre 
avis, plutôt une ébauche des 
principes de l’Art de bien 
vivre, qu’un Système com­
plet & lié dans ses parties. Il 
pourroit y avoir plus d’ordre, 
plus de clarté, plus de détail; 
mais aussi, il ne sauroit y 
avoir plus de paradoxes, plus 
d’associations singulières 
d’idées & de mots, que per­
sonne ne s’étoit encore avisé 
de joindre; plus d’endroits 
propres à piquer la curiosité 
des gens qui n’aiment pas les 
routes battues; & pour tout 
dire enﬁn, plus de pensées 
neuves & originales. Il faut 
en tenir compte au subtil & 
ingénieux Anonyme. Non 
omnis fert omnia tellus ». 
Norton-Perinetti 
translation 
“Such is the general plan 
of morals that our author 
has devised. It is, in our 
opinion, more an outline of 
the principles of the art of 
living well than a complete 
and well-connected system. 
It could have more order, 
more clarity, more detail; but 
also, it could scarcely con­
tain more paradoxes, more 
singular associations of ideas 
and words that no one ever 
thought of putting together 
before; a greater number of 
passages likely to arouse the 
curiosity of people who dis­
like the usual paths; and, in 
a word, a greater number of 
new and original thoughts. 
It is necessary to grant that 
to the subtle and ingenious 
author. Non omnis fert omnia 
tellus.” [One should not ex­
pect everything from every 
person.] 
Maury translation 
“This is the general Plan of 
Morality that our author has 
formed. It is, in our opinion, 
more of a rough draft of the 
principles of the Art of well 
being, than a uniﬁed system. 
It could be more organised, 
have more clarity, be more 
detailed; but also it could 
have more paradoxes, more 
singular associations of ideas 
& words that nobody has yet 
ventured to suggest; more 
points intended to arouse 
the curiosity of people who 
do not like to follow the 
beaten track; & to say it 
all, more new & original 
thoughts. One must consid­
er the subtle and ingenious 
ways of our Anonymous 
Author. Non omnis fert omni 
tellus.” [Not all of the whole 
earth is fertile] 
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<418> « Le grand argument, qui 
détermine notre Auteur à 
rejetter la pensée de ceux qui 
trouvent dans les rélations 
nécessaires des choses, les 
fondemens de la distinction 
du Juste & de l’Injuste, c’est 
non seulement, qu’il ne peut 
jamais résulter de-là des ob­
ligations proprement dites, 
mais seulement de simples 
motifs de convenance, pour 
déterminer à agir d’une fa-
çon plutôt que d’une autre; 
c’est sur tout, que si le Juste 
& l’Injuste découloient de 
l’observation & du viole­
ment de certains devoirs, 
nécessairement attachés à 
telles ou telles rélations, par-
tout ou ces rélations auroient 
lieu, l’observation de ces 
devoirs pourroit être exigée, 
& feroit une vertu, tandis 
que leur violement feroit 
un crime. Or le contraire lui 
semble entièrement démon­
tré par une réfléxion, qui, 
sans être nouvelle, prend un 
air de nouveauté dans ses 
mains, par la manière dont 
il la propose ». 
NOTES 
“The great argument that de­
termines our author to reject 
the view of those who ﬁnd 
in the necessary relations of 
things the foundation of the 
distinction between right 
and wrong, is not only that 
obligations, properly speak­
ing, can never result from 
these relations, but only 
mere motives of agreement 
for determining one course 
of action rather than an-
other. It is, above all, that if 
right and wrong derive from 
the observance and breach 
of certain duties, necessarily 
attached to such and such 
relations, then wherever 
these relations took place 
the observance of these du­
ties would be required, and 
would be a virtue, while their 
breach would be a crime. But 
the contrary seems to the 
author fully demonstrated 
by a consideration which, 
without being new, in his 
hands takes on an air of 
novelty, because of the way 
in which he presents it.” 
“The major argument de­
mands that our author reject 
the thought of those who, in 
the foundations of Right & 
Wrong, found it in the neces­
sary relations of things; it is 
not only that he cannot re­
ject from these foundations 
some so-called obligations, 
but that he cannot rest on 
the simple grounds of expe­
diency, in order to determine 
how to act in one way or 
in another. It is above all 
that if Right & Wrong pro­
ceed from the observation 
& violation of certain duties, 
necessarily attached to such 
relations, then everywhere 
these relations would have 
taken place, the observation 
of these duties would be 
required, & would be a vir­
tue, whereas their violation 
would be a crime. Further-
more, the contrary seems 
to demonstrate entirely by 
reflection, which without 
being new, acquires a sense 
of newness in his hands, by 
the way he presents it.” 
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thirty-three characteristic notes; Heineccius, Historia juris civilis romani, ac germanici, a 
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creation, a seventy-two page review with 171 characteristic notes; Turnbull, Philosophi­
cal enquiry concerning the connexion between the doctrines and miracles of Jesus Christ, a 
twenty-six page review with forty-four characteristic notes; and Cudworth, Systema 
intellectuale huius universi seu De Veris Naturae Rerum, a ninety-three page review with 
153 characteristic notes. Some of these reviews may also be attributed to Barbeyrac on 
other grounds. For further details, see Lagarrigue, Temple de la culture européenne, 50–2, 
and reviews 529–31, 342, 670–71, 1132, 1144, and 532–33 in the list, pp. 288–354. 
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Christianity as old as the Creation; Memoires concernant la theologie et la morale; Enquiry into 
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d’un prince, items 1093, 1131, 273, 376, 591, and 566 in the list compiled by Lagarrigue, 
Temple de la culture européenne, 288–354. 
21 Letter of 29 May 1742, quoted by Moore, “William Smith and Hume’s Treatise,” 
36. 
22 The sale catalogue of Barbeyrac’s library was issued as Bibliotheca Barbeyraciana 
(Groningen, 1744). The auction began 30 March 1745. Several thousand titles were 
offered for sale. 
23 As we go on to show, the attribution to Hutcheson of the critical components of 
the review of Treatise 1, and the whole of the review of Treatise 3, is most clearly made 
by Moore in his “William Smith and Hume’s Treatise,” 8–21. The attributions are more 
cautiously made in the works by Moore and Stewart cited in note 8. Readers should 
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they support Moore’s further conclusion that Hume was not signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by 
Hutcheson, of far-reaching signiﬁcance. Alluding to, among others, this unpublished 
paper, John Robertson has said that the widely held view that Hutcheson had a sig­
niﬁcant inﬂuence on Hume, is “now very much in question. In a particularly original 
contribution to recent scholarship on the Scottish Enlightenment, James Moore has 
argued that the relation [of Hutcheson to Hume] was not one of inﬂuence, but of funda­
mental opposition. His evidence is both circumstantial and philosophical. It seems that 
Hutcheson was almost certainly the author of the successive critical reviews of Books I 
and III of the Treatise of Human Nature which appeared anonymously in the Amsterdam 
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Journal, the Bibliothèque Raisonnée in 1740 and 1741, reviews which made a point of 
exposing the differences between Hume’s work and Hutcheson’s” (“The Scottish Con­
tribution to the Enlightenment” (hereafter, “Scottish Contribution”), in The Scottish 
Enlightenment: Essays in Reinterpretation (Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2000), 
37–62, 47). Vestiges of this perspective on the relationship of Hume and Hutcheson 
survive in Robertson’s articles, “Hutcheson, Francis (1694–1746),” and “Hume, David 
(1711–1776),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. The “original contribution” to 
which Robertson alludes includes Moore’s “Hume and Hutcheson,” in Hume and Hume’s 
Connexions, ed. M. A. Stewart and J. P. Wright (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1994), 23–57. In this paper Moore concludes “that Hume’s moral philosophy was not 
at all Hutchesonian in origin or inspiration” (53). For a response to this claim, see D. 
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Modern Philosophy 2 (2005): 211–56. 
24 Letter of 4 March 1740, Letters of David Hume, 1: 37–38. 
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publisher of Vols. 1 and 2 of the Treatise, was billed for the printing of the pamphlet; see 
D. F. Norton, “More Evidence that Hume wrote the Abstract,” Hume Studies 19 (1993): 
217–22. 
26 Bibliothèque raisonnée 14.2 (1735): 476–83; see also Lagarrigue, Temple de la culture 
européenne, 72, 282, 286. A draft of this account of Simson’s work, in Simson’s hand, 
is found in the Glasgow University Library, Ms. Gen. 196. See Moore, “William Smith 
and Hume’s Treatise,” 7, and W. Trail, Account of the Life and Writings of Robert Simson 
(London, 1812), 83, cited by Stewart and Moore, “Dissenters’ Book Trade,” 24. 
27 This review is carried out off-stage, as it were. The papers of Moore cited (see note 
8) contain no explicit references to or discussions of the putatively relevant writings 
of Hutcheson. 
28 Moore and Stewart, “Scots-Irish Bookseller,” 10. 
29 Moore, “William Smith and Hume’s Treatise,” 16–21. In his letter to Hutcheson of 
16 March 1740, Hume, speaking of the ﬁrst two volumes of the Treatise, said: “I wish I 
cou’d discover more fully the particulars wherein I have fail’d. I admire so much the 
Candour I have observd in Mr Locke, Yourself, & a very few more, that I woud be ex­
tremely ambitious of imitating it, by frankly confessing my Errors: If I do not imitate it, 
it must proceed neither from my being free from Errors, nor from want of Inclination; 
but from my real unaffected Ignorance” (Letters of David Hume, 1: 39). 
30 Moore and Stewart, “Scots-Irish Bookseller,” 10; see also Moore, “William Smith 
and Hume’s Treatise,” 28–29. 
31 Stewart and Moore, “Dissenters’ Book Trade,” 25. 
32 The inconclusive evidence for this possibility: (1) A survey of BR practice for the 
years it was overseen by Smith indicates that multi-volume works published, as the 
Treatise was, over a period of years, were typically reviewed by a single reviewer. See, 
e.g., items 356–7, 593–4, 633–4, 667–8, and 1152–4 in the list compiled by Lagarrigue. 
(2) The author of the review of vol. 3 is familiar with the earlier volumes of the Treatise 
and the review of vol. 1, and with the allegation of obscurity made in the review of 
Volume 32, Number 1, April 2006 
46 David Fate Norton and Dario Perinetti 
that volume: he observes that the author of vol. 3 has tried (without notable success) 
to make his views clearer than he had in vol. 1. (3) The two reviews show a similarity 
of reviewing style. The great majority of reviews in the BR are descriptive extracts. 
The reviews of the Treatise mix description and quotation with objections or criti­
cism. (4) The two reviews also reveal signiﬁcant similarities of language. To cite only 
one example, both take Hume to have described all ideas by the phrase, “faint and 
languid,” used only once (at Treatise 1.1.3.1) to characterize ideas of the imagination 
in contrast to those of the memory. Both reviews then translate Hume’s “faint and 
languid” as “languissantes & foibles.” And, although the phrase “faint and languid” 
is never used in vol. 3, the second review uses the same French phrase, “languissantes 
& foibles” in its translation of the Advertisement to vol. 3. Thus, while in this Adver­
tisement Hume says only that he means “by ideas the fainter perceptions,” the reviewer 
has him saying “by ideas I mean only languishing and weak perceptions” (“par des 
Idées je n’entends que des perceptions laguissantes & foibles”). Further evidence of 
this last kind could strengthen the case for single authorship of the two reviews. See 
also note 50. 
33 On some of the important differences between Hutcheson and Hume, see e.g., 
David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 93, 53–4, 59, 95, 132, esp. 147–50, 205; 
Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought,” 1640–1740 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 284–91; Michael Gill, “Fantastick Associations and 
Addictive General Rules: A Fundamental Difference between Hutcheson and Hume,” 
Hume Studies 22 (1996): 23–48; and James Harris, “Answering Bayle’s Question: Religious 
Belief in the Moral Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment,” Oxford Studies in Early 
Modern Philosophy 1 (2003): 229–53. 
34 The reviewer may also have had a printed copy of the Abstract that had been sent 
to Smith by Noon, for the latter had been sending books for review in the Bibliothèque 
raisonnée since its inception in 1728. Indeed, Noon had more books reviewed in the 
Bibliothèque raisonnée than any other British publisher; see the list of reviews in Lagar­
rigue, Temple de la culture européenne, 288–354. It would be surprising, then, if Noon, 
who had sent the two volumes of the Treatise to Smith, had not also sent him a copy 
of the Abstract, perhaps via Des Maizeaux. Alternatively, Charles Corbet could have 
sent a printed copy to Smith. In any event, a notice of the publication of the Abstract 
appeared in the spring 1740 issue of the Bibliothèque raisonnée, the issue in which the 
review of vols. 1 and 2 appeared. Consequently, it may be that both Hume and Noon 
or Corbet sent the Abstract to Smith. 
35 On 16 March 1740 Hume wrote to Hutcheson: “I must trouble you to write that 
Letter you was so kind as to offer to Longman the Bookseller. . . . Tis in order to have 
some Check upon my Bookseller, that I wou’d willingly engage with another, & I doubt 
not but your Recommendation wou’d be very servicable [sic] to me, even tho you be 
not personally acquainted with him” (Letters of David Hume, 1: 38). 
36 Preface, Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy, ed. Francis Hutcheson 
the Younger, 2 vols. (Glasgow, 1755), 1: xxiv. See also W. R. Scott, Francis Hutcheson 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1900), 57–77, 131–45. 
37 See Temple de la culture européenne, 47, 49–75, 317 (items 688–9). This lack of evi­
dence bears equally on the claim that Hutcheson wrote the review, for it also appears, 
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as Moore puts it (see M2 above), that there is “no evidence, no mention of the two 
reviews in any of the surviving correspondence” or other remains of Hutcheson. 
38 BR 26.2 (1741): 413. The original page numbers of the review appear in angle 
brackets, superscript, in the transcription that follows. 
39 BR 26.2 (1741): 416 
40 BR 26.2 (1741): 421–22 
41 BR 26.2 (1741): 422–23 
42 Reviewer’s Note: “An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue and Moral 
Good. 8°.” The reviewer cites, with a minor alteration (and for or) the title of the sec­
ond of the two treatises making up An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue. 
43 Reviewer’s Note: “Letters between the late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutcheson, con­
cerning the foundation of Virtue &c. 8°. London 1735. No philosophical controversy has 
ever been conducted, by both parties, with so much spirit, candour and politeness, as 
in these letters of Messrs. Burnet and Hutcheson. One can without reservation offer 
them as a perfect model for this kind of dispute.” 
Two remarks are in order here. First, we seriously doubt that Hutcheson would have 
written such an adulatory account of his own behavior. Second, Hutcheson broke off 
his correspondence with Burnet, correspondence published in the London Journal in 
1725, so that he could prepare a less hurried response to the latter’s objections. This 
response he gave in his Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), where, he says, he had “endeavour’d to leave no 
Objections of [Burnet] unanswer’d” (p. xxi). The reviewer also reveals himself unaware 
that Hutcheson had expanded his replies to Burnet and other critics by revisions to the 
claim that he had confounded the perception of objects with the sentiments resulting 
from that perception. In the third edition of his Inquiry, Hutcheson clariﬁed his view by 
explaining that the “quality approved by our moral Sense is conceived to reside in the 
Person approved, and to be a Perfection and Dignity in him: Approbation of another’s 
Virtue is not conceived as making the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy, tho ’tis 
attended with some small Pleasure. . . . The admired Quality is conceived as the Perfec­
tion of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the Pleasure either in the Agent 
or the approver; tho ’tis a sure Source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the 
Approver, tho attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from 
the Pleasure; even as the Perception of external Forms is attended with Pleasure, and yet 
represents something distinct from the Pleasure.” This explanation, he added, “may 
prevent many Cavils upon this Subject” (Inquiry 2.1.8). 
44 Reviewer’s note: “Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher. Dial. III.” 
45 BR 26.2 (1741): 425–6. Moore explains this apparent self-criticism on Hutcheson’s 
part by saying: “This was a remarkable intervention by a reviewer who was consis­
tently critical of the author [Hume] for his lack of modesty. Would Hutcheson have 
demanded such unswerving loyalty, not to say adulation? Certainly, Hutcheson did 
not discourage discipleship of this kind among his followers in Dublin. And an ob­
sequious deference to the leader was characteristic of the correspondence addressed 
to the patron of the ‘friends of virtue’ in Dublin, Viscount Molesworth. If Hume was 
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indeed a faithful follower of Hutcheson’s, as he seemed to be pretending, why had he 
not defended his mentor from his critics? The implication of the reviewer’s rhetorical 
questions was clear. Hume merely appeared to be a follower of Hutcheson’s. In fact, 
he was nothing of the kind.” In notes to this remark Moore refers his readers to the 
“contributions of Arbuckle and others to the Dublin Weekly Journal, 1725,” and to two 
papers by M. A. Stewart, but the materials cited fail to clinch the case for saying that 
Hutcheson immodestly demanded adulation or discipleship. 
46 On being informed in 1738 that La Chapelle was seriously ill, Smith wrote to Des 
Maizeaux: “Si je le [La Chapelle] perds, je perds la personne de tout le Clergé françois 
dont je fais le plus de cas, en qualité d’Homme d’esprit, d’Homme Savant, & d’Homme 
d’honneur, habile Journaliste & excellent Traducteur” (“If I lose him I will lose the 
person I trust the most among the French clergy, in his quality as a man of spirit, a 
scholarly man, and a man of honour, a skilful journalist and excellent translator.” 
Letter of 2 December 1738, British Library Add MS 4288 fos. 150–1). 
47 Le babillard, ou Le nouvelliste philosophe, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Changuion, 1724, 
1735). 
48 La Religion chrétienne démontrée par la Résurrection de Notre Seigneur Jesus Christ 
(Amsterdam: Wetstein and Smith, 1728), 85, 164–5, 280, 282, 302, 304, 308, 309, 
and 325. 
49 The Bibliothèque angloise, ou Histoire littéraire de Grande Bretagne (1717–1728; here-
after Bibliothèque angloise or, in notes, BA). Of the ﬁfteen volumes of the BA, the ﬁnal 
ten were written by La Chapelle. The review of Clarke is found in BA 7.2 (1720): 472–501 
and 9.2 (1721): 420–73; of Wollaston, in BA 12.2 (1725): 369–446 and 13.1 (1725): 1–97; 
of Mandeville, in BA 13.1 (1725): 97–125; of Blewitt in BA 13.1 (1725): 198–225. We 
return to Hutcheson’s Inquiry below. 
50 J. J. Wetstein, co-publisher of BR, attributed these reviews of Boullier to La Chapelle. 
In a letter to the abbé Jourdain, 30 September 1737, about vol. 19 of BR, Wetstein said: “Mr. 
La Chapelle, qui est l’auteur du premier article dans la Bibliothèque raisonnée [of the ﬁrst 
article in issue 19.1] aussi bien que du premier extrait sur l’ame des Betes n’épargne pas 
son confrère Boullier” (Biblio. Nat. Paris, AR 63, fo 161r, cited by Lagarrigue, Temple de la 
culture européenne, 73n. In the same note, Lagarrigue also cites in evidence of La Chapelle’s 
authorship of these reviews MS. C13, pp. 9–10, Bibliothèque Wallonne, Amsterdam. 
51 Among the regular and occasional reviewers of the BR, La Chapelle was the one 
most interested in, and most competent to discuss, the theory of belief found in vol. 1 
of the Treatise. La Chapelle’s translation of Ditton’s Discourse concerning the Resurrection 
of Jesus Christ reveals his interest in theories of belief and moral certainty, and in the 
problems emerging from a probabilistic approach to non-demonstrative knowledge. 
His review of this second edition of Bouillier’s Essai philosophique sur l’âme des bêtes 
conﬁrms this interest, and ﬁnds him drawing a distinction between knowing and believ­
ing, between “savoir” and “croire,” where the former is said to be the result of “evidence 
that strikes us personally” (qui nous frappe nous-mêmes), and the latter is said to be the 
result of testimony. He then objects to Boullier’s attempt to ground the certainty of 
matters of fact on the principle of sufﬁcient reason, favouring instead Ditton’s view 
that the certainty of belief is the product of an implicit obligation; see Ditton’s Discourse 
concerning the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, 2nd ed. (London, 1714), 72–3. Testimony, when 
Hume Studies 
The Bibiothèque raisonnée Review of Volume 3 of the Treatise 49 
properly given, is generally reliable, and skepticism with respect to it would result in 
a total destruction of social institutions. See BR 19.1 (1737): 12, 22–3. La Chapelle was 
also interested in probability and statistical tables, as his article showing acquain­
tance with work on the rate of mortality in London shows. See his “Avis important 
sur les Calculs d’Arithmetique Politique, qui regardent la Ville de Londres,” BR 25.1 
(1740): 164–70. La Chapelle likely had in mind the work by William and Charles Petty, 
Several Essays in Political Arithmetick (London, 1699). 
52 These reviews are attributed to La Chapelle by Lagarrigue, Temple de la culture 
européenne, 297, 307, 354. 
53 “Il faut donc que la Critique d’un Journal soit un peu raisonnée: il y faut de la 
discussion, & des preuves, & comment est-ce alors que l’on peut éviter la raillerie & le 
badinage si l’occasion s’en presente?” BR 3.2 (1729): 380. 
54 “Si jamais la parole a ses perils, c’est en particulier dans cette rencontre. Veut-on se 
borner à énoncer avec simplicité des observations superﬁcielles & communes? Les Sa­
vans s’ennuyent, ferment le Livre, & n’y reviennent plus. Veut-on au contraire s’élever? 
On se rend inintelligible à la plupart des Lecteurs, on les fatigue & ils se dégoûtent. Il 
faut donc être assez habile pour saisir un juste milieu” BR 20.1 (1738): 267. 
55 “Ces façons de parler si peu naturelles, & cependant si fréquentes, font une peine 
extreme” BR 20.1 (1738): 269. 
56 This remark comes at the end of a longer passage: “Peut-être ne serons-nous pas 
toujours assez heureux pour comprendre, & pour goûter toutes les pensées de ce grand 
Homme: mais comme nous ne lui imputerons point notre ignorance, nous attendons 
aussi qu’on ne nous fera pas un crime de l’avoir confessée. Il n’est pas toujours si facile 
de saisir la vérité, quand elle ne se laisse trouver que dans les Labyrinthes d’une longue 
chaine de Propositions compliquées” BR 20.1 (1738): 287. 
57 BR 26 (1741): 412–13. 
58 Traité du beau: où l’on montre en quoi consiste ce que l’on nomme ainsi, par des exemples 
tirez de la plûpart des arts & des sciences (Amsterdam, 1715). For La Chapelle’s criticism, 
see “Nouvelles littéraires,” BA 13.1 (1725): 280–2. Hutcheson’s response was published 
in the “Nouvelles littéraires,” BA 13.2 (1725): 509–18. 
59 BA 13 (1725): 281. 
60 La Chapelle observes that it is “un peu surprenant, que Mr. B[oullier] qui paroît 
aimer assez á citer, ne fasse mentions nulle part de l’excellent Traité de Mr. Ditton, sur 
la Résurrection de J.C. oú il traite de l’Evidence morale avec beaucoup de netteté & 
de précision, & dans un ordre admirable. Mr. B[oullier] n’a pas pu ignorer qu’il y a un 
tel Livre: cependant il ne fait pas semblant de le connoitre; sans doute aﬁn de ne pas 
paroître contredire ce qu’il dit dans son Epitre Dédicatoire à Mr. De Fontenelle, que la 
matière de la Certitude morale est presque neuve.” BR 19.1 (1737): 45. 
61 “Il [Wolff] n’en veut á coup sûr qu’a certains Antagonistes, qui s’opinâtrent à decrier 
son Systême du Meilleur, jusqu’à le faire regarder comme une nouveauté pernicieuse, 
quoique depuis longtems d’habiles Jésuites, Isquierdo, Perez, Mauro & d’autres encore 
l’aient enseigné, à l’imitation de St. Augustin” BR 20.1 (1738): 286–7. 
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62 BR 26.2 (1741): 415. 
63 BR 26.2 (1741): 427. La Chapelle had earlier objected to Mandeville’s Fable of the 
Bees for much the same reason that he objects to Hume’s account of justice. See BA 13.1 
(1725): 97–125. 
64 La Chapelle’s reference is ambiguous; he may have had John’s more famous brother, 
Samuel Clarke, in mind. 
65 “Je confesse, avec beaucoup d’ingénuité, que je n’ai pas assez de penetration pour 
découvrir la liaison de ce raisonnement.” BA 9.2 (1721): 441. 
66 “Je le dirai même ingénument. Quelque cas que nous fassions des lumières & du 
discernement de Mr. Deslandes, nous ne saurions ni adopter toutes ses idées sur les 
différentes matières qui composent l’Histoire Critique de la Philosophie, ni dissimuler 
les raisons qui nous empêchent de les adopter” BR 20.2 (1738): 270. 
67 BR 26.2 (1741): 415. La Chapelle is also fond of the term l’Anonyme, a term used four 
times to refer to the anonymous author of the Treatise in the review of vols. 1 and 2 of 
that work. The term is not used by Barbeyrac when referring to anonymous authors; 
see reviews 273, 376, 566, 591, 602, 606, 681, 1093, 1131–2, and 1144 in Lagarrigue’s list, 
289–350. 
68 “En voilá sans doute assez & peut-être beaucoup trop, pour faire connoitre la Mo­
rale de l’Auteur, ses principes, ses vûes, son stile et sa maniere de raisonner.” BA 13.1 
(1725): 124. 
69 “Mais en voilà plus qu’il n’en faut pour donner une idée de la Morale du profond 
Auteur de toutes les belles découvertes, que le Traité sur la Nature Humaine contient.” 
BR 26 (1741): 427. 
70 These biographical details are drawn from D. F. Bond, “Armand de La Chapelle and 
the First French Version of the Tatler,” in Restoration and Eighteenth-century Literature, 
ed. C. Camden (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1963]), 161–84, 161–6. 
71 BA 13.1 (1725): 110–12. M. A. Stewart has reminded us that La Chapelle’s view is 
in some respects similar to that expressed by John Milton in his Areopagitica. 
72 “My Own Life,” in Letters of David Hume, 1: 2. 
73 For details about these items, see the essay cited in note 2. 
74 See above, at note 24. 
75 This last possibility is one implication of M. A. Stewart’s suggestion that in My Own 
Life Hume was pushing “the line he wished to promote for posterity.” See “Two Species 
of Philosophy,” in Reading Hume on Human Understanding, ed. P. Millican (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press), 67–95, 81. 
76 For a comprehensive description of the physical features of the Bibliothèque raison-
née, see Lagarrigue, Temple de la culture européenne, 167–83. 
77 To locate the texts of the Treatise cited by the reviewer, see the relevant parallel 
notes in the translation below. 
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78 As the preceding transcription shows, the original gives the main title in English 
and then again in French. 
79 Virgil had written, referring to an ideal age, “omnis feret omnia tellus” (“every land 
shall all things bear alike,” Eclogues 4.37). According to Erasmus (Adagiorum 4.4.20), in 
its negative form (“non omnis fert omnia tellus”) and used to refer to the intellectual 
talents of an individual, this proverb suggests that one should not expect everything 
from every person. We are indebted to Georges Leroux for advice regarding this proverb 
and its translation. 
80 It has been suggested to us that “grounds of convenience” would be an appropriate 
translation of the reviewer’s phrase, motifs de convenance. We grant that this suggested 
translation could be an appropriate twenty-ﬁrst-century rendition of the phrase in 
question, but we believe it inappropriate for the philosophical and historical context 
in which it is used. First, “grounds of convenience” does not square well with the philo­
sophical point raised. The reviewer reminds us of Hume’s claim that obligations cannot 
be derived from necessary relations, and then alludes to his concession that necessary 
relations might, at most, produce “motifs de convenance.” In the passage the reviewer is 
discussing, the only concession Hume makes regarding the role of reason in morality 
is that a judgment (reason) may obliquely cause an action (Treatise 3.1.1.9–11; see also 
2.3.3.6) in the sense that the passion prompting the action may be about some mat­
ter of fact that we judge, rightly or wrongly, to be thus and so. In these circumstances, 
necessary relations may give us, indirectly or obliquely, reasons for following a given 
course of action. Although it is not entirely clear what the reviewer intends, it does 
seem that the context of the discussion excludes “grounds of convenience” as an apt 
translation of his chosen phrase. Second, the 1762 Dictionnaire de l’Académie gives two 
possible meanings for a fundamentally synonymous phrase, raisons de convenance. One 
of these meanings is “des raisons de pure bienséance” (reasons of propriety). The other 
is “des raisons qui sont probables & plausibles, & qui ne sont point démonstratives” 
(reasons that are probable and plausible, but are not demonstrative ones). This second 
deﬁnition appears to catch the sense of the phrase, motifs de convenance, used here. 
In short, our translation, “motives of agreement,” is compatible with Hume’s talk of 
oblique causes, and is closer to a likely eighteenth-century sense of the phrase. 
81 For an additional comparison of the same sort, see note 32. 
82 The citations of the Treatise that follow are from the ﬁrst-edition text available to 
the reviewer. This text may differ in minor ways from those of the critical text found 
in the Oxford Philosophical Texts and the Clarendon editions of the Treatise, or from 
that found in SBN. 
83 The previously published translation (by Phillipe Maury, in Fieser, Early Responses 
to Hume, 1: 2–10) fails to translate the line (“Elles sont . . . déraisonnables”) taken from 
3.1.1.10. 
84 Maury includes the following passage (from 3.1.1.24) that is not included in the 
review: “To put the affair, therefore, to this trial, let us chuse any inanimate object, 
such as an oak or elm; and.” It should be noted that Maury does not in fact translate 
the quotations of the Treatise found in the review. He instead inserts the text of the 
Selby-Bigge edition of the Treatise. As our comparisons show, there are important dif­
ferences of sense between the reviewer’s translations and Hume’s original text. 
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85 Maury includes in his translation approximately 130 words that are not included 
in the translation of 3.1.1.25 found in the review. The mistakenly included passage 
begins, “According to this system” and continues through “distinguish’d from the 
reason” [page 301, lines 10–20, of the critical text; page 467, line 36 to page 468, line 
10, of SBN]. 
86 This sentence is more properly understood as a gloss of the opening half of 3.1.1.26 
than as a translation of any given part of the paragraph. 
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